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INTRODUCTION
Nearly sixty years ago, Justice J. Allan Crockett predicted the future. Beginning
with “ideas” in a 1959 dissent, Justice Crockett and this Court reckoned with first principles
of water law that are on a growth-driven collision course. These principles are (1) priority,
a foundation of western water law, and (2) “the highest possible development” of the state’s
water sources, many of which are underground. Such development, Justice Crockett wrote,
is the “desideratum of our water law.” That reckoning resulted ten years later in Wayman
v. Murray City’s “rule of reasonableness,” which, at least regarding groundwater, directs
the district courts to reconcile these first principles, using the “geology, physics, and
hydrology” available to them, to spread the finite resource.
Telling, in this groundwater interference case, are the district court’s questions
during closing argument. They did not focus on Pineview’s admitted interference with
Appellees’ senior groundwater diversions;1 they instead probed mostly what to do about
it.2 Recognizing that there are no shortcuts to this Gordian knot, and invoking Wayman,
the district court was wisely cautious. It ordered, modestly, that the shared aquifer be tested
to determine, first, whether the wells at issue can satisfy the parties’ rights without
interfering with Appellees’ seniority. Retaining jurisdiction to evaluate the results of this
experiment, it retained the flexibility Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness” surely intends.
This, according to Pineview, upends groundwater law.

1
2

(R.1244-50,1287-88,1296-1300).
(R.1244-47,1288,1296-97).
1

Appellees anticipate that the Court will find no error in the pages of this record.
Rather, it will find a fully engaged district court grappling with clear well interference,
parties with limited resources, and a “rule of reasonableness” to guide its adjudication of
the “trouble” Pineview caused. The Court will also find, we believe, that it is largely due
to Appellees’ efforts that we know as much about the “geology, physics, and hydrology”
of these aquifers as we do. On that point, Pineview’s trial and appellate focus is also telling.
In this groundwater-local well interference case, Pineview seems more interested in what’s
happening on the surface rather than beneath it, where the parties’ competing wells divert
limited water from these shared, fully appropriated aquifers.
Interference disputes like this are precisely what Justice Crockett and this Court
anticipated decades ago. Justice Crockett’s “ideas” turned into predictions that became
facts. Utah’s growth guarantees that more cases like this are coming as rights move closer
to rights, which is exactly what happened here. Remedies will be the hardest issue. The
district court’s interference finding is fully supported by the facts—none of which
Pineview seriously challenges and many of which its expert admits. Far from the hellish
result Pineview argues, the district court’s remedy has much to recommend it. It is modest
and starts with testing, which is practical and doable given party resources, and puts the
onus precisely where it belongs—on Pineview, the undisputed cause of the interference.
Finally, Pineview repeatedly derides as merely of academic interest the “geology,
physics, and hydrology” Appellees provided the district court. (Brf.26,28,29). That’s not
how the district court saw it. But more importantly, in a groundwater case, such thorough

2

study is inseparable from Wayman’s directive to apply reason when attempting to reconcile
first principles.
ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARDS
(Code cites are the Utah Code)
Generally, bench tried legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, and factual
findings

for

clear

error.

Roderick

v.

Ricks,

2002

UT

84,

¶¶27-

28; UtahR.Civ.P.52(a)(protects findings “unless clearly erroneous,” after “due regard” for
“opportunity to judge” witness “credibility”). Findings are “clearly erroneous only if …
against the clear weight of the evidence.” Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002
UT 94, ¶12 (modified).
1. Where, like other property rights, Appellees’ senior water rights are bundled
“sticks,” each a separate element of the right, whether Pineview’s underground
diversion, which drains the local aquifers that are the source of those senior rights,
diverted also by wells, interferes with one or more of those elements.
Preserved at R.1220-1223, and reviewed as a “mixed question.” “The trial court
must first find facts regarding the claim of interference and then determine whether those
facts are within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue.” Wayment
v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶9 (citations omitted). On such “mixed question[s],” the district
court’s application of law to fact “typically [gets] some level of deference ….” Id.
When “the issue of interference is extremely fact depend[e]nt,” as it was here and
likely always will be in groundwater cases, the district court gets “broad deference ….” Id.
The issue in this case is extremely fact-dependent and expert-driven “because underground
3

waters cannot be observed nor measured with precision, but must be determined on the
basis of geology, physics and hydrology …,” Wayman, at 863, relative to “the water right
at issue, Wayment, ¶9. “[A]ppealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty
to marshal the evidence.” Id.; see State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶42.
Deference under mixed question review, however, depends on the nature of the
issue. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶25 (“selecting the appropriate standard . . . from the
spectrum of possible levels of deference”).3 Concerning water, this Court invokes “a
strong public policy interest in promoting consistent and predictable results in disputes over
the permissible use of that water” such that “district court discretion [is] somewhat
constrained ….” Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, ¶18 (emphasis added). This
action, however, does not concern, at least directly, the “permissible use” of water. Searle
addressed a proposed change in use—point of diversion—under §73-3-3 and -8. Searle,
¶¶4,23. Here, changed use is not the issue. Rather, in this straightforward interference
action, junior groundwater rights are diverted too close to senior groundwater rights,
interfering in multiple ways. (R.406,1248,1214). Invoking Levin’s revised Pena factors,
nothing about this case warrants restricted deference. See Levin, ¶25. Rather, Wayman
creates a large “pasture,” State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-938 (Utah 1994), granting the

Considering: “(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule
is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on
‘facts’ observed by the trial judge … relevant to the application of the law that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record …’ and (3) other ‘policy reasons … for or against
granting discretion ….’” Levin, ¶25 (citations omitted).
3

4

district court quite broad discretion, guided by what surely will be a case-specific, factdriven “rule of reasonableness.” Wayman, at 865.
2. Where Appellee’s senior rights consist of several elements, whether full or even
unauthorized use of one of those elements—quantity or purpose of use—immunizes
Pineview as a matter of law against a claim of interference with other elements of
the rights.
Preserved at R.221,1220. This issue of first impression presents a legal question that
turns on the “interpretation of prior precedent, statutes, and the common law,” reviewed
for “correctness.” Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶6.
3. Where Pineview knew or should have known that its twice pump-tested #4 well
interfered with Appellees’ nearby wells diverting from the same source, whether the
district court erred in finding it negligent for operating that well, interfering with the
function of the existing wells and their only source, thereby interfering with the
senior water rights they divert.
Preserved at R.1248-1250 and reviewed as a “mixed” finding that “calls for
deference to the lower court.” Manzanares v. Byington, 2012 UT 35, ¶43.
4. On the question of injunctive relief, where the district court enjoys some of its
broadest discretion to fashion a remedy under Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness,”
the purpose of which is to “insur[e] the highest possible development and … the
most continuous beneficial use of all available water …,” id. 862, whether (a) the
district court erred when it ordered the parties to determine aquifer yield relative to
the rights of each, retaining jurisdiction to evaluate the results, thus preserving its
5

authority to fashion different or additional remedies, and (b) whether Pineview
preserved this issue, having failed to propose meaningful alternatives under
Wayman.
Preserved at R.223-224,293,321-322 and reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Wayman, at 865. “[T]o the extent that the pasture is large, the trial judge has considerable
freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts ….” Pena, at 937.
5. On the question of damages, where Appellees own the senior rights in a source
invaded by Pineview’s junior diversion, and as a matter of law are entitled to the
first water from that source, whether they are obligated to pay Pineview for that
water after their access to it was cut off by Pineview’s multifaceted interference.
Preserved at R.221-222, and reviewed for correctness regarding the “rule [or
method] for measuring damages,” Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81,
¶28 (citation omitted), and for clear error regarding the amount. Id. ¶21 (“damage
determination was a question of fact”).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Trial exhibits are identified as “P-Ex. _,” and D-Ex. _”)
1. The Local Aquifers
“The effort to try to understand the case and to try to solve it” with some
semblance of the “scientific method has all been on [Appellees]. They
are the ones who paid for the monitoring.” They incurred “the expense to
put these monitoring devices in their well and attempt to resolve the case
with clear data.”
(Paul Anderson, geologist)(R.783).4
4

Anderson explained the general geology and hydrology of the area. (R.660-69).
6

“An aquifer is a geologic formation, or group of formations that yield usable
quantities of water to wells and springs.” (R.1120). Here, there are two: A bedrock
formation known as the “Norwood Tuff,” overlaid with unconsolidated material,
(R.393,647,650), and characterized by the USGS as “low permeability.” (R.648). “[T]he
unconsolidated material is generally … a much better aquifer material…” because bedrock
“is very tight … it has very low permeability, or porosity.” (R.650-51). Fracturing,
however, can “enhance its hydrologic characteristics ….” (R.393,651). “An aquitard is a
lower permeability layer, a less permeable geologic layer.” (R.1121). The aquifers
experience normal seasonal fluctuations—drawdown in the summer and recharge in the
fall, winter, and spring. (R.393,779-81,1129). Overall, there is no general decline.
(R.393,811). This area is within the Weber River “[d]rainage,” (P-Ex.10A), which along
with the Ogden River, is “fully appropriated.”5
2. Water and Wells Generally
Water flows from high to low pressure. (R.394,960). “[I]t can flow uphill, or
downhill, but it's related to that pressure [g]radient. If the deeper aquifer has a higher head
than the shallower aquifer, but it's above it, we’d call that a pressure head differential. And
that there's a differential for flow to go from one to the other.” (R.960). “[S]tatic head” in

5

Pursuant to Evidence Rule 201(c), the Court may, on request, judicially notice the records
and policy of the Utah Division of Water Rights concerning the Weber River drainage.
The Court may find the Division’s current policy here:
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/policy/wrareas/area35.asp
(Addendum 4); see also Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶30, n.8 (“[J]udicial
notice may be taken of [water right] documents as public records.”)(modified).
7

a well is the water level “when the well [is] not pumping,” “[v]ersus a pumping head” when
it is. (R.658). Well casings are perforated to allow water in. (R.674-75).
A pumped well creates a “cone of depression,” in which the water level drops
“rapidly within the well. And then gradually away from the well, in this arc shape … if you
think of it in three dimensions … it's a cone.” (R.670,1122; cf. Bingham v. Roosevelt City
Corp., 2010 UT 37, ¶3.). The cone’s actual three-dimensional shape depends on
surrounding geology. (R.395,670-71). The cone creates a “radius of influence,” a zone
measured from the well outward “that is dewatered due to well pumping.” (R.394).

(R.669-671;P-Ex.52).
Seasonal precipitation (“re-charge”), and withdrawals from wells (“discharge”), is
typical. (R.699,857). The United States Geological Service uses monitoring wells “all
around the State … in different … hydrologic basins” for “long-term [water level]
monitoring.” (R.766). One such well near Huntsville “is monitoring ground water level in
the Ogden valley near” these parties’ wells. Id. Monitoring shows expected seasonal
fluctuations, but generally the Ogden Valley is stable. (R.393,809,810-11).

8

3. Snowberry Inn Rights and Well
Araves built, owned, operated, and lived in the Snowberry Inn bed and breakfast for
a dozen years before moving to their current home nearby. (R.5). The Inn was originally
served with a “6-inch well, 120 feet deep,” (the “Red House well” (R.499)) for .015 cfs,
year-round (.45 acre-feet), (P-Ex.10A;R.520,626), for “[d]omestic: [o]ne family,” with a
“1960” priority. (P-Ex.10A). The “source of supply” is “Underground water.” Id.6 They
installed a “cistern,” a “storage tank with a monitoring system … to ensure the pump
wouldn't run dry and destroy [it].” (R.500). The cistern was measured at an “effective
capacity” of approximately 300 gallons. (R.847). The Red House well was replaced in 2001
with the current SI well, (P-Ex.20;R.395), because of “poor yield” (sand may have
infiltrated). (R.696-98;P-Exs.18-20;695). The new well is 75’ away. (R.697). The pump
fills the cistern and then turns off. Another pumping system gets the water, under pressure,
to the Inn. (R.522-23). The Red House well was limited to the unconsolidated aquifer.
(R.395,693).

Pineview contends that the diversion rate of the SI right is a “condition” “added to avoid
local shallow wells from pumping too aggressively and depleting the local aquifer.” (Brf.78, citing D-Ex.55). The source for that claim, the State Engineer’s 1961 Memorandum
Decision approving the SI water right, states that these “small domestic and stockwatering
uses” “should [] be allowed” because they “will not deplete the flow of the Weber or Ogden
River systems.” (D-Ex.55,¶2). It also states, “[e]ach of the applications has been reduced
in quantity to .015 sec.-ft. (6.73 gallons per minute) for the domestic requirements of one
family, or a forest camp, and stockwatering purposes.” Id. There is no mention of the
“condition” Pineview urges. Rather, like all appropriations and approved changes, SI’s
right was certificated “subject to prior rights.” (P-Ex.10A). See §73-3-17(1),(6). So was
Pineview’s when it moved rights to #4. (P-Ex.33).
6
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The old and new SI wells showed similar static water levels, within one foot,
(R.395,703-04;cf.P-Exs.19-20), suggesting they hit the same aquifer. (R.395,704,114950(Loughlin: “good indication” of same aquifer)). The 2001 SI well is likely perforated in
“both unconsolidated material … and [Norwood] … right across the boundary,”
(R.700,702), but the ratio in each is unknown. (R.986-87).7 SI pumps between 20 and 30
gallons-per-minute (“gpm”). (R.815-16). Araves sold the Inn to Venture in 2005. (R.5).
Pat Dohrer assisted in the purchase of the Inn and managed it from approximately August
2005 to August 2014. (R.540). The current SI Well is 133 feet deep, with perforations at
105 to 125 feet. (R.6,395,702).
4. Arave and Southwick Rights and Well
The Arave well “was drilled to a total depth of 187 feet, with both 6 and 4-inch
diameter casing. The 4-inch casing runs from 80[’] to 187[’]. The 6-inch from 0 to 80[’].”
(R.686). It is perforated at 140-170.’ (R.395,686,689). When drilled, “the static level was
28 feet below the land surface.” (R.687). The lower portion of the well, from 130’ to 180’,
is likely in Norwood, which is the source of its water. (R.688-89). Its perforations “are
completely within the Norwood …” and “do not communicate directly with the
unconsolidated material.” (R.714). The Arave well was cleaned in 2013. (R.690;P-Ex.16).
The Araves own Water Right 35-1483, for year-round use, “[d]omestic: one family,” and

“[W]e don't know how much …” (R.702). “[T]hat's an interpretation that you're forced to
make by some of the ambiguities of drillers’ logs.” (R.703). P-Ex.28 is Anderson’s crosssection of all the wells showing relative positions, including perforation zones. (R.706-15).
7
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“[s]tockwatering: 2 horses.” (P-Ex.11A). Its source is “[u]nderground water (well),” id.,
with a 1963 priority and a 0.15 cfs (.506 acre-feet). (P-Ex.11A;R.212,391,518-19,692).8
Janet Southwick’s water right (35-6773) is for 1 acre-foot from the Arave well
allowing .25 acres of irrigation and one EDU with a 1978 priority. (R.391,574-75;PEx.12A-12D). Her home is just north of the Inn. (R.573).
5. Pineview Well #4
a. Paul Anderson’s prior contact
Anderson was contacted in 2001 by Radford, a developer planning to drill a well.
(R.639). Using a groundwater model, they identified a location where Radford could find
water. (R.639-40). “[S]hortly after that,” Radford ordered Anderson to “stop all the work”
because he wanted “to re-think this thing.” (R.640). He contacted Anderson again in 2003
explaining that he wanted to “drill an irrigation well.” Id. They discussed “optimal places,”
Anderson researched the local geology “and tried to advise [Radford]” on the likelihood
“of producing the amount of water he” was looking for. Id.
Anderson determined that a well could encounter water based on local geology.
(R.641). While he “talked in general terms,” he “was never consulted about the specifics
of the location.” (R.642). A year later, Radford returned, explaining that he had begun
drilling, was about 200’ down, and had drilling samples he wanted Anderson to see.
(R.642). Anderson saw, and determined that drilling had encountered Norwood. (R.642).
Radford retrieved the materials; Anderson “never heard from [him] again.” (R.643).

“ELU” or “equivalent livestock unit” (R.195). And one EDU—“equivalent domestic
unit.” (R.195,520,574).
8
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b. Pineview tests and later operates #4
Well #4 was drilled in 2004. (R.502-03). Its priority is October 14, 2005.
(R.392;Brf.10-11).9 It was pump-tested and shut down the Arave well inside of a day,
(R.396,503-04), after which it recovered within a day. (R.396,504). A second pump-test
shut down Arave again. (R.396,504-05).10 The #4 is 738 feet deep, (R.395), perforated in
four zones, starting in the “unconsolidated deposits,” “typically where water will flow
better, faster.” (R.681). The lower three perforation zones are in Norwood. Id. #4 pulls
water from both aquifers. (R.681-82,713).11 The #4 and SI wells pull water from both the
unconsolidated and Norwood. (R.713).
Well #4 is in hydrologic communication with both the SI and Arave Wells. (R.71415,1142-45,1130-31). The SI well appears to have “a considerable influence from the
[much more permeable] unconsolidated aquifer.” (R.705-06). The SI Well reaction to #4
pumping is delayed, or “baffled,” (R.785-89,961-63,1234-35), likely explained by “which
way the fractures flow or are oriented within the Norwood,” (R.962-63), or the hydrologic
connection between the Norwood and the unconsolidated material (recall that SI Well
perforations may intersect both the Norwood and the unconsolidated). (R.700,702).
#4’s “cone of depression” grows up to 1200 feet quickly, encompassing both the
Arave and SI wells, pulling water “away from those perforations.” (R.794-95,1130-31).

9

Pineview also owns water right No.35-7263, modified by a change application, with a
2003 priority. (D-Ex.4).
10
#4’s well log, P-Ex.14, is explained at R.675-79.
11
Anderson explained factors that complicate a precise determination of which zones
produce water. (R.682-83), “but the preponderance of depth of this well is in the Norwood
Tuff,” suggesting that it is the largest source. (R.683).
12

The speed of #4’s cone indicates some fracturing in the Norwood, explaining why that
normally less transmissive material allows water to move more quickly. (R.795-96). #4
pumps at 100-105 gpm, (Brf.11), much more volume from the aquifer than SI or Arave.
(R.794,883,885-86).
c. “Trouble”
For Pineview’s expert, a non-technical definition of “safe yield” is “the amount of
ground water that can be pumped from a well or wells without getting into trouble.”
(R.1121-22).12 Such “trouble” means, for example, pumping the water to such a level as
to interfere with someone else’s water right. (R.1122). Pineview began operating #4 in
2007, effectively shutting down the Arave well again. (R.396,577). Araves agreed “to pay
$20 for [Pineview] to provide [them] water through its system.” (R.505). Pineview
immediately connected Araves, “and disconnected [their] water system to the home from
the well,” making them Pineview customers. (R.397,505,1256-57).
“Trouble” in the SI well started in August 2007 after #4 came online, and the Inn
“ran out” of water. (R.541). They first noticed the problem when the Inn “had no water,”
(R.541-42), with nothing coming out of the faucet. (R.542). Prior to #4, the Inn’s new well
“never had any interruptions” or “problems at all.” (R.398,541,605). After #4, SI didn’t
have “any water.” Id. Unable to pump, Dohrer hooked a hose to Araves home (connected
to Pineview by then, R.542) “to fill the cistern.” (R.605-06,1238). Until connecting to

Not to be confused with the statutory definition of “safe yield,” having to do with
groundwater management plans. §73-5-15.
12
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Pineview’s system, it was “a constant battle of checking the cistern to make sure we had
water.” (R.541).
With #4 pumping, the cistern would not fill, “[a]nd we’d have to supplement
through the hose up to [Arave’s] house.” Id. This lifeline from Araves was used until
Pineview connected the Inn. (R.542-43). When #4 pumps, SI struggles. When #4 is off,
SI works just fine. (R.943-46). The difference is stark: SI pumping alone drops the head
“about 6 feet versus” “almost 40 feet during summer” when #4 pumps. (R.945-46). Even
when “you see this rise in head regionally, you can still see that [SI] is still being affected
by the pumping of” #4. (R.963). SI “pumping is the worst in terms of how far down it’s
drawn … when [#4] had its greatest effect on the Arave head.” (R.964).13
d. More “trouble”
Following a change in Pineview management, Araves tried but were unable to agree
on written terms. (R.505). After several years operating under their handshake deal, things
soured, resulting in this action. (R.505-06). Araves did not pay for water when they had,
and could use, their well. (R.506). Pineview even back-charged Araves at higher rates and
threatened to shut off water if not paid. (R.506-08). The Pineview water caused “staining”
in the Arave home. (R.509-10). Other than “normal wear and tear,” Araves had no water
availability or pressure issues prior to #4. (R.510-11). Neither did they have such issues
with the SI well. (R.511). Araves had their well cleaned and the pump removed and

Based on the underlying assumption, agreed to by Pineview’s expert, that the monitored
Arave well is such a good “proxy,” or Laughlin’s word, “surrogate” for #4 pumping.
(R.963,1104).
13
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replaced with monitoring equipment. (R.512). Araves did not want to be Pineview
customers. (R.516).
They used their well indoors and for garden watering, (R.517), having been told by
the Division of Water Rights that they could water their yard. (R.537-38). Araves have not
reconnected their well since Pineview connected them. (R.524-25). It continues to be used
for monitoring, providing cleaner data. (R.397,1132,781-82). The prior Pineview president
(Brockbank) oversaw their connection to the system. (R.1065; P-Ex.56).
The Inn experienced a number of issues caused by Pineview’s water—clogged
faucets, for example. (R.401,543-45). The Inn’s dealings with Pineview were the same as
Araves—cooperative at first, deteriorating later. (R.550-51). Like Araves, the Inn also paid
a flat $20 per month. (R.397,550-51). The Inn’s Pineview connection was, and is,
supplemented by its well. (R.556-57). Pineview water was used indoors. (R.558). Dohrer
kept a log of well vs. Pineview water use, (R.398,563-64;P-Ex7), and at trial explained that
his log was not perfect. (R.399,995-96). The Inn did not pay for water when it could use
its well. (R.565).
Southwick lost water quickly after #4 was tested, causing her sprinklers to fill with
silt, later having to replace some of them due to buildup, (R.401,576,582). The second
pump test damaged her washing machine, requiring a new one. (R576,581-82). The loss of
water from the Arave well “affected everything in [her] house that ran water ….” (R.577).
Pineview’s water pressure to Southwick’s home was deficient. (R.583-84). Repairs were
attempted, but still she “can’t do two things [using water] in [her] house” at the same time.
Id. Prior to #4, Southwick never had water problems other than an instance of frozen pipes.
15

Id. Because irrigating with Pineview water is costly, Southwick lost her lawn, trees, and
other foliage around her home. (R.580).14 Additional problems were ongoing at the time of
trial. (R.584). She had no such problems before connecting to Pineview. (R.582-83).15
Since 2014, Andrea Burk (Southwick’s daughter, R.593) operates the Inn pursuant
to a lease with Venture. (R.399,590). She dealt with the hard water and pressure problems
when she lived with Southwick. (R.593-94). She also experienced hard water issues,
sometimes such that “the system has shut down completely while” guests are there. (R.592
She did not understand the particulars of the Venture water right, and she did not measure
water flow from the SI well. (R.594-95). A pump in the Inn pulls water from the cistern
and fills pressurized tanks that distribute water throughout the Inn. (R.996-98). Inn
sprinklers were on timers to water every few days. (R.999-1001). Burk did not realize until
trial that she was using well water for the lawn. She thought she had turned it off. Id. She
simply didn’t understand the valve operation between the Pineview and well water.
(R.399,1010-13,1016,1020). The original Venture right is not approved for outdoor use.
(R.1011).
Dohrers assigned claims to Venture, consisting of expenses incurred. (R.604;PEx.1). Venture paid nearly $8,000 to connect to Pineview. (R.606). Venture asked the
Dohrers and Burk to use both the SI well and Pineview water to ensure that the Venture

Pineview’s connection to Southwick’s home leaked, causing her to pay for excess water
she did not and could not use. (R.581). The leak was repaired. Id.
15
The Arave well did not have an auto-shutoff that might have prevented the silt problem.
(R.587).
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water right was not at risk of forfeiture. (R.606,622-23).16 The Venture right was not
enough to meet SI’s “needs,” which admittedly exceeded its “rights.” Venture squared up
matters with the state engineer when it augmented its supply with a state engineer approved
2 acre-foot right, (R.398,607-08;P-Ex.10F), with 2017 priority, (R.630-31), allowing
outside irrigation use (.75 acre-feet) and commercial use for 1.25 acre-feet, all based on
usage calculations and estimates. (R.627-28).
Venture incurred costs as a result of losing its “water independence” and its
connection to Pineview. (R.609). In November 2013, Pineview threatened to cut off water
service to the Inn, forcing this action. (R.614). Venture prepared a calculation of the Inn’s
water use since Burk began managing it. (R.617). Neither Arave nor SI wells were metered.
(R.536,619-20). During the three year period prior to trial (before augmenting its right),
the Inn averaged .58 acre-feet. (R617-18). Then Venture determined its water use during
the period prior to #4 turning on, typically July 1 each year. (R.618). Venture used .29
acre-feet of its right prior to July 1.17
6. Anderson’s Well Monitoring
Araves retained Anderson, a geologist, for well monitoring, (R.635-38), and
Venture agreed to split that cost “to understand more about what’s going on ….” (R.635).18

16

§73-1-4.
The Inn’s water use declined after Burk began sending out some of the laundry.
(R.592,620). SI used approximately .33 af of its water right before #4 turns on. (R.102223,1025)(average use using Pineview figures). Prior use likely exceeded that calculation
for the recent past. (R.1027-28).
18
Pineview criticizes Anderson for conflating water “needs” with “rights.” (Brf.47).
Perhaps he did, (R.867-68), but he was not retained to evaluate the “rights;” he was retained
to do some “science” and “to gather some … hard data to try to understand exactly what
17
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They developed a plan and installed monitors in the Arave and SI wells, a device that “will
sense the pressure in the water column” in the well, “recording pressure readings as the
water levels fluctuate.” (R.654).19 Their purpose was (still is) “to try to gather some science,
or some real information because [Appellees] were having great difficulty with Pineview
….” (R.654-55). Anderson did not evaluate potential interference from other wells in the
area. (R.936-37). The SI and Arave wells do not interfere with each other: “the impact of
pumping such a low rate in the [SI], and the fact that it's a combined aquifer of the
unconsolidated and the Tuff, that it's not a great enough volume of water to get that cone
of depression” to the Arave well. (R.989).
Anderson’s 2013 SI pump tests demonstrated that, without #4 depleting the aquifer,
“[i]t's sort of the happy time for the Snowberry aquifer.” (R.797). Without #4 pumping,
“it only took about 10-15 minutes for [the SI well] to fill the cistern.” (R.797-98;P-Ex.23
(Addendum 6). When #4 pumps, however, “there's quite a profound difference in terms of
the length of time that it takes to fill the cistern.” (R.805). Without #4, the SI head drops
only six feet while filling the cistern. (R.804,945-46). With #4 on, it drops nearly 40 feet,
and possibly more. (R.945-46).20 Unfortunately, “there are no head values from [#4].”
(R.782).

was happening in those wells.” (R.654-55). The district court credited his analysis over
Loughlin’s assumptions. (R.401).
19
More water in the “tube” means more pressure, less water means less pressure. (R.654).
20
Possibly more because it drops from 62 feet down to 99, where the sensor is, and we
“don't have measurement beyond that.” (R.805-06).
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When #4 is off, “the length of time that the [SI] pump is on to supply the irrigation
system is relatively short. And when the level gets below 58 feet, the pump seems to
struggle to meet that same demand, as evidenced by the pumping head.” (R.932). The
problem is not about a particular “volume.” Id. Rather, the SI well must pump longer
“cycles” to keep up because “the pump has to remain on a lot longer to supply an assumed
similar volume of water.” (R.933).21 Anderson’s conclusions are based on 2013 data. He
did not have #4 pumping dates for 2014-2017, but because the monitored Arave well is
such a good “proxy” for #4, Anderson could determine #4 pumping by looking at Arave
well data. (R.937-38,954). Pumping #4 is the only way to generate the data. (R.950). When
#4 was restarted after an off period, the Arave well responded “immediately,” (R.953),
dropping “continually” as long as #4 pumps. (R.953-54).
Some of SI’s drawdown is based on its own cone of depression. (R.982). True of all
wells. Bingham, ¶3. The problem is a cascading effect triggered when #4 dewaters the
aquifer, causing Arave level to plummet, creating downward pressure on SI, causing it to
struggle severely. (R.789-90;P-Ex23). A “pressure differential” is created when the Arave
level drops below the SI head. (R.790). As a result, “we see this relationship that when the
head differential changes, that [SI] seems to struggle in order to produce the water that's
being called for by the [I]nn, and this takes place in all of the monitoring years.” (R.791;
see also R.792,807-08).

Anderson “assum[es] that when they sprinkle in the spring … and when they irrigate in
the summer, whatever they put on [in terms of volume] “stays the same ….” (R.933).
21
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The apparent connection between the Norwood and the unconsolidated explains the
different but correlated reactions in the Arave and SI wells. (R.792-93). Thus, “[r]egardless
of some of the wrangling of hydrogeologists, there's this high correlation between no
trouble prior to [#4], and problems after [#4].” (R.793-94, and see R.961). Anderson could
not say precisely how those aquifers communicate. (R.809,892-93).22 We need more data.
More on that below. Pineview’s hypothesis that SI pumping creates its own problems
could be tested “if we could get [#4] to stop pumping for a summer season. And then we
could monitor the Snowberry well ….” (R.982).
7. Pineview Operation
Turner was elected Pineview president in 2009 “when the developer, at that time,
was president and was bowing out ….” (R.1043;P-Ex.56). Appellees are not Pineview
shareholders; they are “contract users.” (R.1047). #4 pumps early July to early September
depending on weather. (R.397,1055-56). It “run[s]… up to 12 hours a day, [“typically
every day”] during the max of the summer dry period” depending on weather. (R.105657). Pineview does not know how much it diverts from its surface sources—it has no weir.
(R.1067-68). It has 70 connections with buildout to 114. (R.1073). Its system is plumbed
to serve additional lots from #4. (R.1075-76). It remains to be determined whether

The higher Arave water level compared to SI creates “an upward gradient between these
two perforated zones.” (R.968). That pressure “gradient” reverses when #4 pumps, pulling
water away from Arave, causing SI to crash also. (R.968-69). This reversal creates the
“potential for flow to go from the unconsolidated down to the Norwood.” (R.969-70,987).
P-Ex.28 shows “the difference in elevation between the Arave and the Snowberry there, at
scale.” (R.988).
22
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Pineview expands service. (R.1078-79). It already does not have enough supply for more
secondary water. (R.1079).23
8. Pineview’s Expert – Loughlin
Loughlin sees no “relationship between pumping [SI] and the water level in the
Arave well.” (R.1094,95). #4 drops the level in Arave but not in SI. (R.1097-98). He
contends that SI’s trouble is caused by seasonal declines and its own pumping. (R.10991100). He agrees with Anderson that “the water level in the Arave well is a very good
surrogate” for when #4 “is on and when it’s off.” (R.1104-05,1119-20).

He used

Anderson’s data. (R.1106). He has no doubt that #4 was pumped as indicated on
Anderson’s graphs. (R.1119, see P-Exs.23, 24, 26 (Addendum 7); 27 (Addendum 8); 29
(Addendum 9), 30).24 Where there was missing data, Loughlin was sure that #4 was
pumping “[b]ecause we know from the pumping in 2013 that the water level--pumping
[#4] lowers the water level in the Arave well.” (R.1119).
He agrees that
a. A radius of influence terminates where the cone ends, as illustrated on PEx.52. (R.1124).
b. Water flows down gradient from high to low pressure, higher head to lower
head, or in the direction of decreasing pressure. (R.1125).

23

Turner did not know of any company records regarding existing water rights before #4
was drilled. (R.1076).
24
Loughlin did a couple of his own graphs, (D-Ex.48)(using Anderson’s data), and one
that Appellees liked. (P-Ex.40)(R.1139-40)(“showing that connection between [#4] and
Arave, correct? [Answer:] Yes.”).
21

c. #4 interferes with Arave. (R.1125-26).25
d. There is no doubt the Arave well is within #4’s cone of depression. (R.1129).
e. SI is closer to #4 by a couple hundred feet and also within #4’s cone of
depression and within its radius of influence. (R.1130-31).26
f. Arave responds to #4 pumping “within minutes, or at least within an hour or
so.” (R.1131). Arave level “drops steeply,” which continues as long as #4
pumps. (R.1131;cf.R.772-75,777,811,813).27
g. The “notches” on P-Ex.27 show #4 pump cycling on and off. (R.1132).
That’s why Arave is a good surrogate for #4—its quick response to #4. Id.
See also P-Ex.40. (R.1139-41).
h. Not pumping Arave provides cleaner data. (R.1132).28
i. #4 has four perorated zones, one in both the unconsolidated and Norwood
and three in the Norwood. (R.1133,1135-36).
j. SI gets a portion and probably the majority of its water from the
unconsolidated aquifer, (R.1133,1138), and #4 pulls from the unconsolidated

25

Yet, it does not matter to Loughlin whether #4 is pumping to determine whether the
Arave well can produce the Arave and Southwick water rights. (R.1127).
26
Loughlin drew #4’s cone on P-Ex.29, explaining, “[i]t probably looks something like
that.” (R.1130).
27
Or, as Pineview counsel explained during cross, when #4 “starts, we see an immediate,
or near immediate decline [in Arave]. When it stops, we see a near immediate increase.”
(R.979-80).
28
Agreeing with Anderson, (R.781-82), “With no pumping [in the Arave well], we can
clearly see these relationships.” (R.782).
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aquifer. (R.1133;P-Ex.29). Yet, he insists on “zero communication” between
#4 and SI. (R.1138-39).
k. SI and Arave may communicate. (R.1142-45).
l. #4 affects Arave due to the “response of a confined aquifer . . . . It is
transmitting the lower pressure created by pumping [#4] away from the
[well].” (R.1146).
m. Arave water level is higher than SI. (R.1156-57,1160; P-Ex.27)(elevation
above sea level).
n. Depending on the well, lowering the pump too close to or at the perforations
can cause the pump to take in silt. (R.1159-60).
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The action was filed December, 2013. (R.1-15). Trial to the bench was August 1718, 29, and September 25, 2017. (R.263-69,355). The parties filed trial briefs (R.191-262)
and competing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (“FFCL”). (R.270-323).
The district court rejected Pineview’s FFCL October 19, 2017, (R.356-86), and adopted
Appellees’ in its Memorandum Decision November 14, 2017. (R.387-414)(Addendum 1).
The court found that pumping “well #4 interferes with the Arave well, thus
interfering with the senior Arave [and Southwick] water rights.” (R.408-409). Further, that
pumping “interferes with the SI well, thus interfering with the senior Venture water rights.”
(R.409). The court found that “[t]he fact that, historically, SI . . . has or may have used
more water than is permitted by its water right is not a defense to local well interference”
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and it is not “a defense that SI used water for irrigation when it did not then have” an
approved right for that purpose. (R.410).
Because the “#4, Arave and SI wells cannot coexist” under these circumstances, the
court ordered Pineview to “stop[]” or “curtail[]” its pumping of #4 “sufficiently to permit
the Arave and SI wells to function.” (R.411). “[I]n aid of its judgment,” the court
“retain[ed] jurisdiction” to determine “whether … [#4] can be pumped at a lesser rate so
as not to interfere” with both the Arave and SI wells. (R.412,440,442). If not, “the court
may order that [Pineview] provide replacement water pursuant to §73-3-23 at [its] sole
expense.” (R.412-13,441).
The court also ruled that Pineview breached its duty of “reasonable care” when it
operated #4 in a “manner that interferes with plaintiffs’ wells.” (R.409). It awarded
damages based on interference and negligence. (R.413). Final judgment was entered
January 4, 2018 (R.439-42)(Addendum 2), adding Rule 54(d) costs on January 10, 2018.
(R.445-46)(Addendum 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Bundling elements of a water right – quantity, place of use, purpose of use, source,
diversion means and method, and priority – the law protects them all against interference.
The district court understood both the analogy and the water rights at issue. It got it right
and determined that pumping of Pineview’s interfering well had to stop until it could figure
out a way for all three wells to coexist, if possible.
The facts, at least the ones above ground where Pineview prefers to focus, are
simple. The part of the case that matters most, however, is hundreds of feet below the
24

ground, where things get more complex. Despite their senior, year-round rights, Appellees
cannot divert their water for up to three months, while #4 pumps. The data shows it, and
Pineview knew it, which is why it connected them to its system that first summer of
“trouble.” Even without complete pumping measurements and records, the evidence of
Pineview’s interference with several “sticks” in Appellees’ rights is clear and compelling.
The interference issue was driven mostly by expert testimony. Pineview’s expert
admitted that both the Arave and SI wells are inside #4’s cone of depression. Analytically,
that presented a problem, so he assumed that a geologic barrier, an aquitard, separated and
sealed the SI well from the de-watering effects of that cone. The district court didn’t buy
it. Likewise, this Court should not be persuaded by Pineview’s misguided argument about
source – that Bingham applies here. The facts in that case are not only distinguishable in
terms of remedy, they explain how #4’s operation obstructs and hinders access to the
groundwater on which Appellees have the senior call.
In this local well and groundwater interference case, the district court roamed its
broad pasture and evaluated its options. Its probing questions during closing argument
reveal an engaged court, duty-bound to remedy a problem no one can actually see. It
appropriately awarded interference damages and fashioned remedies well within
Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness.” It also ignored the competitive rallying cry that
Appellees should just “chase their water.” Most importantly, the district court wisely left
room to adjust remedies to fit future data. Pineview is wrong in its claim that this result
upends groundwater law; it is rather the precise effort district courts must undertake to both
honor priority while stretching a finite resource.
25

ARGUMENT
A. The district court correctly found interference with senior rights.
Interference is “obstructing or hindering the quantity or quality of an existing water
right.” Wayment, ¶13 (affirming interference).29 Interference comes in many forms
because a water right consists of many things. It is real property. §57-1-1(3) (R.404).30
As such, it is usefully described as a “bundle” of rights, Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558
P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977)(real property is “bundle of sticks”), each representing some
feature of the usufruct. See, e.g., State v. Starley, 413 S.W.2d 451, 463 (Tex.Civ.App.
1967)(“the complex bundle of legal principles which make up the water right”)(citation
omitted); Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 245 (Colo.
2002)(“the bundle of rights constituting a Colorado water right”)(citation omitted);
Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377, 400, n.9 (Mont. 2007)
(“elements in the bundle of sticks recognized as a water right.”).31
Those sticks include quantity, place of use, purpose of use, period of use, source,
method or means of diversion, and priority. (R.404-05). See, e.g., §73-3-17(6)(Addendum
5); Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1953)(protecting

It means “[a]n obstruction or hindrance.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 937 (10th ed. 2014)).
30
Subject to eminent domain. §10-7-4(2).
31
A water right’s “usufructory” nature, however, distinguishes it from other real property.
Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185 (Mont. 2011) (citation
omitted). “The words ‘property right’ draw to themselves and connote a bundle of old,
sacred, absolute, and inviolate ideas of exclusivity, possession and permanence. Although
these concepts are not alien to water law, they are not the language of water law ...
because water law does not deal with these things, but with uses, re-uses, sharing, and
priorities rather than exclusivity, possession or even permanence.” Id. (citation omitted).
29
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source); Wayment, ¶11 (protecting diversion method). The law protects them all. “From
the beginning of our history, when” water is “diverted” “and applied” “to a beneficial use,”
the appropriator’s “right” to divert “was recognized as being prior and superior to the rights
of all subsequent appropriators to the extent of [its] reasonable necessities ….” Justesen v.
Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1935).
Since then, “as new conditions presented themselves … our courts have
consistently enforced this right of priority and protected appropriators not only as against
all subsequent claimants taking water from the body of the stream, but as against all persons
interfering with its source.” Id. See also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000
UT 3, ¶33 n.14.32 Among these “new conditions” is growth. Utah’s population “trebled”
since the 1960’s. Delta Canal Co. v. [Vincent], 2013 UT 69, ¶24. Growth requires that
we develop “all available water.” Id.
1. Interference was highly factual and expert driven.
“Determinations regarding the weight” of expert witness testimony “are within the
province of the finder of fact ….” AmericanWest Bank v. Kellin, 2015 UT App 300, ¶25
(modified).

An expert “may not give an opinion which represents a mere guess,

speculation, or conjecture.” State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 1980). Experts may
testify concerning “probability, possibility, or likelihood” so long as the opinion represents
the expert’s “best judgment to a reasonable certainty.” Id. Helpfully, Loughlin, using all

32

Abrogated on other grounds by Otter Creek Res. Co. v. New Escalante Irr. Co., 2009
UT 16, ¶¶11-13.
27

of Anderson’s data, agreed with much of Anderson’s analysis. (R.1104-06,1119,112432,1139-41;P-Ex.29).
Because Pineview’s interference occurs hundreds of feet below the ground, in the
source where the water is, (R.1213-14), the issue was driven mostly by expert testimony.
Groundwater presents a more difficult case “[b]ecause [it] cannot be observed nor
measured with precision, but must be determined on the basis of geology, physics and
hydrology.” Wayman, at 863. In Silver Fork, for example, the city claimed that residents
interfered with its Big Cottonwood Creek surface right. 2000 UT 3, ¶16. It lacked “actual
measurements … illustrating that diversion of water at the mine significantly diminished
[creek] flow ….” Id. ¶27. This Court reasoned that interference, even with a surface right,
does not depend on such “measurements reporting flow before and after interception of the
water at its source.” Id. If available, “their value is limited to the extent that other
environmental factors dictate flow, such as season and amount of precipitation,” id., as
Loughlin explained. (R.1101 (“water levels rise and fall seasonally”)).
Pineview rests heavily on the lack of well pumping measurements and records.
(Brf.13-15,27-29;R.1256-57 (“no yield data”)). But the issue never was as narrow as
Pineview wanted. It seemed satisfied with Loughlin’s opinion that Appellees could
ultimately get their water. (R.1108-09). Between approximately October through June,
that is true. Between July and whenever the aquifer recovers from #4’s dewatering,
however, that is not true. For that entire period, as much as one-fourth of their year-round
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right (R.1214), they went to the well, but “[t]he well was dry ….”33 (R.396,502-03,54142,584). Not completely dry; the water is there, possibly hundreds of feet deeper than where
it is before #4 turns on. (R.1113;P-Ex.54).
2. The district court found facts showing interference.
The evidence of interference is compelling, and Pineview does not challenge the
facts. First, however, a word about Wayment. When this Court says that no one may
diminish the quantity of another’s rights, as it did in North v. Marsh, 504 P.2d 1378, 1379
and n.2 (Utah 1973), and where it prohibits “direct[]” and “indirect[]” interference, as in
Rasmussen v. Moroni Irr. Co., 189 P. 572, 577 (Utah 1920), it protects each of the sticks
in the water right bundle. (R.404-405). The analysis breaks nicely into Wayment’s two
prongs: “The trial court must first find facts regarding the claim of interference,”
(accomplished here R.408-09),34 “and then,” with added emphasis, “determine whether
those facts are within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue.”
Wayment, ¶9.
In other words, “the water right at issue” is not only a bundle of many elements, it
has varying features. It can be surface or groundwater or both, for any of a variety of uses,
measured in cfs, acre-feet, or both, storage or direct flow or both, or other distinguishing
features. The particulars of “the water right at issue” drive the interference analysis.

Robert Frost, Going for Water, 1913 (“A Boy’s Will”).
And not seriously challenged. Pineview does not marshal on this or any fact question
and yet insists that the court got the finding of interference wrong. To demonstrate clear
error, Pineview must “overcome[e] the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings”
by “identify[ing] and deal[ing] with [the] supportive evidence,” establishing a legal
problem in that evidence. Nielsen, ¶¶40–41.
33
34

29

Pineview contends, however, that the district court never reached Wayment’s second prong.
(Brf.29-33). Appellees contend that most of the case was about that second prong.
a. Pineview interfered with the period of use.
A water right’s period of use is “the time during which the water is to be used each
year.” §73-3-17(1)(d). The Appellee senior rights are year-round. (R.1214;P-Exs.10A12D).35 Well #4 is turned on around July 1 each year and runs through the end of the
irrigation season, typically through September. (R.397,1056-57). Interference with the
Arave well is all but immediate, (R.396,1249), and lasts beyond #4’s shutdown due to
aquifer recharge. (R.401,891). The effect on the SI well is delayed but no less crippling
as the water disappears within #4’s “cone of depression,” draining the aquifers. (R.961963). For about three months of every year, the senior rights are inaccessible while #4, with
its junior rights, takes the water. (R.397,399-401,408-09,1214,1223,1294). Pineview does
not challenge these facts.
b. Pineview interfered with the diversion means and method.
The senior rights are groundwater rights, approved specifically for use only from
the Arave and SI wells. (R.391-92). As a matter of law, the wells are the only authorized
means and point of diversion. (R.3-4,405;P-Exs.10-12; cf. §73-3-17(6)). As a matter of
fact, the wells are the only physical means. This Court has long protected diversion method
or means. If a junior user could render a senior user’s “diverting means or methods”
ineffectual, by making “prior appropriations of water unavailable with impunity,”

35

Except for that portion of Southwick’s right permitting irrigation. (R.391,574-75).
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then there is in fact no such a right as a prior right, but all rights may,
at any time, be invaded or destroyed by a subsequent appropriator by
simply making the diverting means used by the prior appropriator
useless. To permit such an invasion of a prior right would, in effect,
amount to an indirect taking of a prior appropriator's water. This
neither the legislative nor the judicial power can allow without
permitting confiscation of property rights.
Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147, 152 (Utah 1911)(holding in connection with surface
rights that the original appropriator “also acquires the right to continue use of his method
or means of diver[sion]”), relied on in Wayment, ¶13, n.10.
Again, #4’s effects on the Arave well are swift. According to Loughlin, Arave is “a
good surrogate” for #4, meaning that pumping #4 is quickly detectable there. (R.1104).
The cascade effect then tumbles to the SI well (R.963), which is also within #4’s cone of
depression. (R.1226-27). Once #4 is running, the senior rights cannot be diverted with the
only possible means and method of doing so, at least not without great difficulty for SI.
(R.411).36 Pineview does not challenge these facts.
c. Pineview interfered with the source.
A water right “attaches to the point of diversion and extends to the source.”
Meridian Ditch Co. v. Koosharem Irr. Co., 660 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 1983)(citation
omitted). The “name of the stream or water source” is a required element of the certificate
of appropriation issued by the state engineer, signifying the “right to use the water ….”
§73-3-17(1)(e);(6). See, e.g., Richlands Irr. Co. v. Westview Irr. Co., 80 P.2d 458, 465

36

Pineview obsesses over an SI pump test showing 25 gpm for 2 hours without dropping
the water level. (P-Ex.54;R.1109-1111;Brf.10,37). True, but only “[w]hen [#4] is not
running.” (R.895).
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(Utah 1938)(water right “includes an interest in the source(s) … surface or underground.”).
Silver Fork, ¶22, and n.6. Silver Fork relies on Little Cottonwood, 443 and n.2, which in
turn relies, inter alia, on Justesen:
[O]ur courts have consistently enforced th[e] right of priority and
protected appropriators not only as against all subsequent claimants
taking water from the body of the stream, but as against all persons
interfering with its source. It makes no difference whether the
interference be with the main stream or the tributaries thereto, or
whether the interference be with water flowing over the surface of the
ground, flowing in subterranean streams or merely percolating
through the ground.37
Justesen, at 805; see also Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P.2d 755, 766 (Utah 1935).38
37

Appellees proposed FFCL, adopted wholesale, included the following altered quote from
Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1953): “[N]o one can
interfere with the source of supply of [a water right], regardless of how far it may be from
the place of use, and whether it flows on the surface or underground, in such a manner as
will diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of the water of these established
rights.” (R.405). Pineview is correct that the brackets replace “this stream,” but that does
not change the meaning of the passage, and was certainly not intended to. (Brf.31). That
“stream” was and is “fully appropriated.” Id. at 443. The Court’s larger contextual point
is that interference with a water right source of supply is interference with the right itself—
one of its sticks. The context of that quote is the Court’s treatment of the claim in that case
that additional water was available for appropriation. Even so,
such waters are unappropriated and available for appropriation if they can be
extracted from the ground without interfering with the quantity or quality of
water available for the use of the prior appropriators. The fact that this water
comes from the same source of supply as the surface stream which has been
fully appropriated, and in a sense has been appropriated as carrier water to
bring the surface water to the diverting works, does not make it unavailable
for appropriation if it can be beneficially used without diminishing the supply
available for prior appropriators.”
Id. 444 (emphasis added). The Court’s footnote 2 in that paragraph is a string cite to several
cases explaining that source is among a water right’s protected elements. That is all we
intended with the bracketed “a water right”—shorthand for the larger point Little
Cottonwood and many other cases make. See, e.g., Silver Fork, ¶33, n.10.
38
The holdings in Justesen and Wrathall were codified in 1935 to include groundwater in
the state’s public waters available for appropriation “subject to existing rights.” §73-1-1(1).
See Silver Fork, ¶31, n.11.
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Explaining death by a thousand cuts, Rasmussen observed that “[i]f a “landowner
and water user [] cut[s] off a[] source of supply, and so on until all the sources of supply
which pass underneath the surface of the soil are cut off . . . the lower and prior appropriator
would be left without any, or at least only a meager, supply of water in the low-water
season. This may not legally be done.” Id. 577. Similarly, in Gardner, concerning rights in
Utah Lake, this Court held that “[u]nder no condition should [a subsequent appropriator]
be permitted to take water from the lake [the source of supply] until they can do so without
interfering with … prior rights.” Id. 153.
Peterson v. Wood, 262 P. 828, 831 (Utah 1927), practically reverses the burden of
proof when a junior right takes or threatens water out of priority to the senior right’s
detriment: “The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that whoever claims he has
developed water in close proximity to the source … previously appropriated by others, is
charged with the burden of proving that his alleged development of water does not interfere
with the waters theretofore appropriated.” Cf. Searle, ¶2 (change applicant must
demonstrate “reason to believe” no impairment of existing rights).
Anderson explained, Loughlin admitted, and the district court found the direct effect
on the Arave well, and the delayed or “baffled” effect on the SI Well. (R.400-01,96162,1124-26,1129,1130-31,1133,1135-36,1138,1142-45).39 Loughlin agreed concerning
Arave, (R.1125-26), but testified, incredibly it turns out, that the SI well taps its own

Anderson explained that the mere fact that “water [is] available” in the aquifer still leaves
doubt: “There was some water available, but we don't know that until we pump test it.”
(R.895).
39
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aquifer, (R.1164-65), and its problems (which did not exist before #4, R.398,541,605), are
self-inflicted. (R.1110-1112). He had an analytical problem, however. Admitting that both
wells are inside #4’s cone of depression, (R1130-31;P-Ex.29), he had to find a way to
isolate SI. To do that, he postulated an “aquitard” of some unknown nature, size, and
location that sealed off SI from everything, evidently, including the dewatering effect of
#4’s cone of depression. (R.1121,1124,1232-33).
Loughlin’s speculation about SI’s own aquifer took him well beyond anything the
data could support. He was impeached into admitting that SI and Arave communicate, and
that if that’s true, then #4 and SI must also communicate. (R.1130-1146,1239-40). By
assuming the aquitard he needed, he stopped doing the “geology” expected by Wayman
and switched to economics. City of Los Angeles v. U.S. DOT, 179 F.3d 937, 940, n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)(“How does an economist escape from a 25 foot hole? Answer: Assume a
ladder.”).40
B. Bingham’s holding regarding groundwater does not apply.
A centerpiece of Pineview’s argument about source is Bingham (Brf.24-25).
Pineview argues that (1) Bingham articulates the correct “interference analysis,” and (2) it
applies here because it says, minus Pineview’s double emphasis, that plaintiffs there had
“no protectable interest in the level of water in the soil beneath their land,” and “no such

Pineview asserts that “Loughlin explained in detail the lack of a correlation between [#4]
and the [SI well] …[giving reasons].” (Brf.17). Actually, he was, at best, confused. He
had already admitted in deposition that SI and Arave communicate, and that Arave and #4
communicate, and if so then SI and #4 must also communicate. (R.1142-45,1133,1138),
all of which is happening inside #4’s cone of depression. (R.1130-31,1129;P-Ex.29). Still,
he insisted on “zero communication” between SI and #4. (R.1138-39).
40
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enforceable right … to their soil saturation or the level of the water table.” (Brf.25;2010
UT 37, ¶12). Bingham does not help Pineview. That case explains exactly why those
plaintiffs stood in very different legal shoes than Appellees. Clarifying the interference
claim, this Court distinguished Bingham from this case:
[interference] can be invoked only by a party with an enforceable
water right. Our prior discussion with regard to the nature of the North
Hayden Group's property interest makes clear that its members have
no such enforceable right with regard to their soil saturation or the
level of the water table.
Bingham, ¶53.
Not only does each Appellee have “an enforceable water right,” they are the senior
rights in the source (R.392,408-09), which unlike the Bingham plaintiffs, happens to be the
groundwater beneath their homes, (R.406,1222), and the same water #4 extracts first only
because it has a longer, more powerful straw. (R.399-400,409). Appellees’ “[s]ource of
supply” is “[u]nderground water” from a “(well).” (P-Exs.10A,11A,12D). The Bingham
plaintiffs had no such rights; they benefitted only indirectly from groundwater. Id. ¶6. Not
so here. These plaintiffs own senior rights pumped from wells captured and invaded by
Pineview’s junior water diversion and the large cone of depression (between a quarter and
a half mile in diameter) it creates. (R.1146;P-Ex.29).
Pineview again doubly emphasizes Bingham’s statement that interference requires
some act “obstructing or hindering [a plaintiff’s] ability to obtain that water.” (Brf.2425;2010 UT 37, ¶48). “[T]hat water” is the “water to which the prior appropriator is
entitled.” Bingham, ¶48 (citation omitted). And that is the point of this case. That water
Pineview pumps hundreds of feet below Appellees’ wells is the very same “[u]nderground”
35

water on which Appellees have the senior call. (R.392,408-09; (e.g., P-Ex.10A); §73-31(5)(a)). Pineview’s well operation plainly obstructs and hinders their access to it. (R.40609). Pineview does not challenge these facts.
Bingham also points out that plaintiffs there were “capable of obtaining all of the
water to which they are entitled in the same manner in which they have been diverting it.”
Bingham, ¶53. Pineview argues that, because Appellees’ wells are capable of producing
their allotted water, there can be no interference. Those wells can indeed produce that
water, and more, but only when #4 is off. Appellees cannot “obtain” their water via their
wells (the “manner in which they have been diverting it”) as long as #4 pumps,
approximately one-fourth of the year. (R.397,399-401,408-09,1214,1223,1294).
C. Improper water use is not a defense to interference in this case.
SI overused its right. (R.398,410-411). It and Araves put water on some lawn and
flowers but should not have. (R.398,1213). Curing that problem (with aid of new counsel),
Venture acquired an additional to 2 acre-feet. (R.398,607-08). The district court noted
correctly that water use is “regulated by the Utah State Engineer, who has enforcement
powers pursuant to §73-2-25 if water is used without the right to do so, or beyond an
existing right.”41 (R.411).
Pineview contends that “illegal” use, (Brf.38-39), is a complete defense to the fact
of interference that its expert admits Pineview caused. (R.1130-46,1239-40). As the

“[T]he state engineer may commence an enforcement action … if [he] finds that a person
… is diverting, impounding or using water in violation of an existing water right ….” §732-25(2)(a).
41
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district court noted, nothing about this case or the evidence of interference would be
different if SI had stayed within the limits of its pre-augmented right. (R.410-11). Had any
Appellee used a little less water between January and June, or between October and
January, the interference is the same because between July and the end of September the
wells will not work. Id.42 When #4 was on, SI needed the Arave lifeline just to keep its
cistern filled. (R.542-43). That’s why Pineview connected the Inn. Furthermore, now that
Venture has acquired the water sufficient for SI’s “needs,” there is no doubt that Pineview’s
interference will not change. #4’s cone of depression that invaded Appellees’ source
before Venture made things right with the state engineer returns each time #4 pumps.
Pineview skirts around its admitted interference, (Brf.14-15,37), instead pointing
out that Appellees exceeded their rights and could have obtained more data than they did.
True both times. First, in this case, the nature of the interference did not affect how
Appellees’ used their rights. That’s what Wayment means when it focuses the analysis “on
the water right at issue.” Pineview’s interference does not affect that particular stick in the
bundle—the “purpose” of use. §73-3-17(1)(c). And quantity is not an issue when #4 is
off. (R.398,540-41,577,582,605). Second, regarding data, with an unlimited budget we
could learn a lot about the “geology” of these aquifers. Appellees spent the money to
understand them sufficient to prove the interference, (R.635,654-55,783), with an assist
from Loughlin. (P-Ex.29; supra at 21-23).
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Pineview had standing to counterclaim if it could have shown that overuse by senior
rights interfered with its junior rights. Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1). Failure to file a compulsory
counterclaim “result[s in a waiver.” Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
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D. The finding of negligence is proper.
Negligence requires (1) a “duty” owed by Pineview to Appellees, (2) its breach, (3)
a finding that “the breach …was the proximate cause of [Appellees’] injury, and (4)
“damages” “in fact.” Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993). Bingham invoked
another Justice Crockett opinion, N.M. Long & Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolas Construction,
343 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1959), where this Court “weighed the rights of a landowner and a
water rights holder,” Bingham, at ¶61.43 “What is important … [is] whether the actions
that caused that change were reasonable and undertaken with due care for the rights of
others.” Id. Accordingly, “every person has a right to use his own property … so long as
that use does not invade” neighboring “rights” “unreasonably and substantially.” Id. ¶61
(citation and emphasis omitted).
“Invade” describes vividly what Loughlin drew (P-Ex.29), what Anderson
explained, (P-Exs.14-30), and what the district court found. (R.478-79,1130-31,1035).
Pineview’s #4 was pump tested in 2004, and the interference with Arave was quick and
thorough. (R.396,504). A second pump test that year confirmed it. Id. Then, in 2007,
when there is no doubt that #4 was Pineview’s responsibility, (R.396,577), it put that well
into service, quickly shutting down Araves’ well, resulting in their and Southwick’s
immediate connection to Pineview’s culinary system. (R.396-97,505,1256-57). SI joined
them in August. (R.542-43). Pineview pumped knowing, or it should have known, that its

The reasoning in N.M. Long is “fully applicable to a claim to prevent actions that might
lower the water table.” The pressures of growth and the need for water, “and the
corresponding necessity for restrictions upon the manner in which property rights may be
exercised,” increase with time. Bingham, at ¶62.
43
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well interfered with nearby senior rights. Pineview’s “method” of diversion “foreseeably”
harmed Appellees. See Bingham, at ¶65. Appellee’s “damages” consist, first, in the loss
of their water rights and wells and the independence that comes with those property rights.
(R.401-03,441).
E. The district court imposed proper remedies.
This is a case about discretion, and specifically the size of the “pasture” in which a
district court may roam for the principles necessary to reconcile inherently competitive
principles. The first rule is priority—as “[b]etween appropriators, the one first in time is
first in rights.” §73-3-1(5)(a). A senior right is entitled to its full complement “before
junior” rights get anything. Heal Utah v. Kane Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist., 2016 UT
App 153, ¶6. “Beneficial use” is, in turn, “the basis, the measure and the limit” of a water
right. §73-1-3. Embedded within beneficial use is the “desideratum of our water law”—
to develop as much of the “available water” as possible without waste. Wayman, at 867.
“The duty to” avoid waste is bound up with the objective of achieving “the greatest duty
possible for the quantity of water available …. regardless of … priority ….” In re Water
Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah 1960). The objective
is always and everywhere to “assure the greatest possible use of the natural resource.” Id.
(citation omitted).
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1. The district court has broad discretion to fashion Wayman remedies.
Because we live in a desert, the legislature and this Court have “fashioned” water
law “in recognition of the desirability and of the necessity of insuring the highest possible
development and of the most continuous beneficial use of all available water with as little
waste as possible.” Wayman, at 862. In that statement, this Court recognized the inherent
tension between the rules of priority and beneficial use.

On one hand, priority is

everything—“the one first in time is first in rights.” §73-3-1(5)(a).44 On the other hand, it
is not everything. It shares equal footing with the need to develop as much water as we
can. Wayman, at 867.
Finding interference was not the district court’s toughest task. The evidence was
practically lopsided.(R.396,398,399-403,406-10,411-12,440,502-05,582-83,592,891,96163,1214,1223,1249,1294;P-Exs.23,26,27,29,30,40). Pineview’s expert placed both
Appellee wells, with their senior rights, inside #4’s cone of depression, which dewaters
both aquifers. (P-Exs.29,52;R.1130-31).
The difficulty was fashioning a remedy that honors priority while following
Wayman’s broad instruction to develop as much water as possible. Pineview contends that
the district court “announce[d] a dramatic departure from established ground water law
…,” (Brf.1), and “failed to correctly apply the law.” (Brf.2). If affirmed, Pineview warns,
the decision “would upend decades of established law relating to groundwater
administration.” (Brf.3). Pineview sees the decision as a “guarantee [of] a particular level

For example, when adopted, Utah’s Constitution “recognized and confirmed” “[a]ll
existing” water rights “for any useful or beneficial purpose.” Utah Const. Art. XVII, §1.
44
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of water in the water table” for “the most senior right.” Id. It argues that the judgment
“guarantees the water level in the Arave Well is always higher than” in SI. (Brf.40).
That is incorrect. The remedy only begins there, returning these rights to their proper
priority now that interference is established. The district court has that discretion. The
court further ordered cooperation and data collection to determine whether there is an
optimum point where all the rights can be satisfied while honoring Appellees’ priority.
(R.411-13,440-41). But that is not the end of the story.
Decided in 1969, Wayman is cited in a handful of published decisions but never
substantively applied. This may be the first post-Wayman well interference case to reach
this Court.

Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness” in allocating rights in groundwater

“involves an analysis of the total situation: the quantity of water available, the average
annual recharge in the basin, [and] the existing rights and their priorities.” Wayman, at
865 (emphasis added). “What is desirable,” and what the district court tried to do here,
is the best possible adjustment of the rights of these parties in
relationship to each other, and without undue or unreasonable burden
upon either, and at the same time serve the desideratum of our water
law of putting and keeping to the beneficial use the greatest possible
amount of available water.
Id. at 867.
Pineview proposes, instead, that these senior right owners should “chase their
water,” (Brf.39-40), not because of drought or other natural forces, but because Pineview’s
longer straw diverts its junior rights using a well several times more powerful and hundreds
of feet deeper, taking all the water, effectively reversing priority in its favor. (R.395-
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96,408).45 Our remedy, says Pineview, is to just drill deeper, and to keep drilling,
presumably at our cost, until we catch up to its cone of depression. This Court in another
Justice Crockett opinion already rejected this appropriator-with-the-longest-straw-andmost-money-wins “chase” to the bottom:
It must be realized that underground water basins do not emerge from
some mysterious inexhaustible source. They are replenished only
from natural precipitation and surface waters. Prudent management of
water resources requires that only the average annual recharge be
withdrawn. To do otherwise simply results in competitive chasing the
water level down by ever deeper wells.
Fairfield Irr. Co. v. White, 416 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1966).46
2. The district court wisely left room to adjust remedies.
Despite a lack of substantive judicial gloss on Wayman, this case is not this Court’s
first rodeo on similar issues. Decided a few years before Wayman, Fairfield shows just
how right our district court is. There, Fairfield had senior rights in certain spring flow. Id.
642. It sought an injunction against a landowner and a church from pumping their wells
(two to three miles away), which caused decreased spring flow. Id. Tests showed, just like
they do here, that when the wells were pumped spring flow dropped, and when the wells

Appellees agree that they and all appropriators must “chase their water” when the source
retreats or dries due to natural conditions. In California, where many of its groundwater
basins are overdrafted due to drought, “extractors must dig deeper wells” when “the water
table drops.” Kelly Hart, The Mojave Desert as Grounds for Change: Clarifying Property
Rights in California's Groundwater to Make Extraction Sustainable Statewide, 9 Hastings
W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol'y 31, 34 (2002). Here, however, the experts agreed that the
drainage is not in general decline, but is stable, with normal seasonal fluctuations.
(R.393,779-81,809-11,963,1129;P-Exs.26,27).
46
And at whose expense? Certainly not Appellees’. Cf. Andrews, 533 (“reasonable basis”
for interfering parties to “share equally” in the “expense” to make senior rights whole).
45
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were off, spring flow returned “almost immediately,” indicating, as similar tests did here,
a shared source. Id. 643.
The district court there enjoined some of the well pumping and ordered replacement
water. Id. 642. It declined to enjoin the church “but retained jurisdiction to take further
evidence … as to any such interference.” Id.;cf. R.412,440,442).47 Wayman does not
address a specific remedy in the event of local well interference; for example, whether the
senior right must drill deeper. The fact-driven “rule of reasonableness” may in the right
case indicate that remedy, just not here, at least because (1) #4 is 500+ feet deeper, so
Appellees should not have to pay for it, and (2) it’s a bad idea. Fairfield, at 645.
The result Pineview says upends all of our groundwater law—the district court’s
experimental, data-gathering, retained jurisdiction remedy designed to further water
development while protecting senior rights—bears a striking resemblance to Fairfield’s,
where this Court explained, previewing Wayman:
This is in conformity with the policy of the law of encouraging and
promoting the development and use of water resources and of not
interfering therewith unless it is clearly shown that doing so infringes
some established prior water right. Nevertheless, due to lack of
certainty about the matter the trial court acted wisely in retaining
jurisdiction to further consider the possibility of such a relationship
after more tests and observations have been made; and if any such
relationship is found to exist, to grant appropriate relief.
Id. 646 (emphasis added).48

47

Experts in Fairfield testified that a geologic barrier separated the church’s aquifer from
that of the company and the landowner. Fairfield, 646. That testimony was, evidently and
unlike Loughlin’s, persuasive. Id.
48
Justice Crockett dissented in Current Creek v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528,533-38 (Utah
1959), because he thought the remedy too harsh, and wrote Fairfield and Wayman,
43

The district court in Fairfield and here “wisely” left itself room to adjust remedies
to fit the data, virtually all of which Appellees paid Anderson to collect, that Loughlin
relied on, (R.1106), and that Pineview now criticizes. The district court here did precisely
what Fairfield and Wayman require—ordered data in an effort to adjust the rights to each
other and the “available water,” Wayman, 862, and left its options open, including, “[i]f …
#4 cannot be pumped at a level or rate that does not interfere … the court may order …
replacement water … at [Pineview’s] sole expense.” (R.441)(emphasis added), citing §733-23. Cf. Andrews, 531-33 (replacement water ordered).49
3. The district court needs flexibility and options.
A district court tasked with a “rule of reasonableness” in the allocation of rights in
the use of groundwater has and must have room to roam, to experiment. This Court laid
that groundwork in Pena, establishing a durable framework for how to think about what
district courts do. The “pasture” in which all courts below this one are permitted depends
on the nature of the issue. Levin, ¶24. Narrow fences define pure legal questions. Id. On
the other end, the pasture is wide, allowing continuing jurisdiction and innovation. Id. This
is that case.

distinguishing Andrews in Wayman. 458 P.2d at 863, n.3. That distinction is important.
Wayman was a §73-3-3 change application case involving existing wells and a plentiful
source. Wayman, 863. Like this case (at least with respect to Appellee’s local aquifer),
Andrews was a “new withdrawal” from the source. Id., and n.3.
49
Pineview’s #4 is just one of five wells approved for use at the same time as #4. (P-Exs3233), a fact that the district court considered in evaluating its, and Pineview’s, options.
(R413 at ¶iii; 441 at ¶iii).
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District courts employing Wayman must do what only courts of equity can do, which
is to figure out how to stretch a finite resource as far as possible while honoring priority.
(R.406-07). Wayman, at 865; Fairfield, at 646. To do that, they need flexibility—a wide
pasture—to deal with unique facts, party resources, and the “ambit of interference as
applied to the water right at issue.” Wayment, ¶9.
In Wayman, supply was not a problem. “The underground basin involved [there]
still ha[d] an abundant supply of water.” Wayman, 863.50 Here, supply is an issue. The
“drainage area,” (P-Ex.10A), in which these rights exist is “fully appropriated.”
(Addendum 4). And, Wayman did not involve “a new withdrawal in a basin which
adversely affects the flow of wells prior in time and right.” Wayman, 863. (emphasis in
original). There, the city only improved existing wells. Id., 864. A “new withdrawal” is,
however, what happened here. (R.390). #4 is a new straw drilled hundreds of feet below
existing diversion points in an already fully appropriated drainage where Appellee’s senior
rights and wells functioned just fine until Pineview showed up. (R.390,396,408). 51 These
facts are closer to Andrews and Fairfield than to Wayman, but Wayman’s “rule” applies.52

50

The area was then still open to appropriation. See
https://waterrights.utah.gov/docSys/v919/w919/w919009g.pdf at 29.
51
By way of illustration, the state engineer’s Salt Lake Valley Groundwater Management
Plan urges that new wells “should be designed, constructed, and operated so that, when
pumped at its maximum flow rate, it will not cause more than 12 feet of draw down on an
existing well unless the owner of the new well provides just compensation to the affected
well owner(s).”
See https://waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/mmplan/ugw/slf/slvmgpln.pdf, at §4.0.
52
Wayman was a §73-3-3 change application case, but Fairfield was not, and Andrews is
a blend, involving state engineer decisions and other complex claims. Andrews, 530.
Yet the remedies are similar in the sense that they are adapted to their respective facts,
suggesting that the problems they addressed, that are present here, and that are sure to
45

The district court ordered #4 shut down or curtailed followed by testing to find the
sweet spot where all three wells can, hopefully, co-exist. (R.412-13,440-41). Pineview’s
criticism of the district court’s step-at-a-time remedy might mean something had it
proposed Wayman-style remedies of its own. Instead, it proposed that Araves could set a
pump deeper in the well, (R.278,296,332,346), starting the very “chase” this Court rejected
in Fairfield fifty-two years ago. Perhaps with more data lowered pumps or deeper wells
could work. The district court’s retained jurisdiction “in aid of its judgment” preserves its
discretion when that data comes.
Bereft of any other ideas for remedying its admitted interference, Pineview asked
for its “attorney’s fees and costs” based on alternate grounds, first for “injuries caused by
diversion of water in violation of an existing right.” §73-2-28(4). It made no such
counterclaim and has no such injuries. Its other grounds were that this action is “without
merit and not … in good faith.” §78B-5-825. (R.295,350-52). The record, passim, resolves
that. Pineview’s expert admitted interference and all the predicate facts supporting it.
(R.1124-26,1129-33,1136,1138-46,1156-57,1159-60;P-Ex.29).53

follow, will be addressed in a consistent fashion. These cases are and ever will be “so
complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing” all of them “can be spelled out.”
Pena, at 939. Wayman’s “rule” is about as precise as the Court can get without risking the
unintended consequences of an overly restrictive pasture.
53
For the same reasons, the Court should dispense with Pineview’s fee request here.
(Brf.47-48). Seeking fees and summing up its entire appellate argument, Pineview
contends that Appellees “offered no proof of the amount of authorized water that they
[were] unable to obtain when” #4 pumps. (Id. 47). Pineview skips over that part of the
case in which we proved with Loughlin’s help that between July 1 and the end of the
irrigation season, the Arave well pumps nothing, and the SI well cannot keep up.
(R.397,399-401,408-09,1214,1223,1294). Without the lifeline from the Arave home (by
then a Pineview customer), the Inn could not have functioned. (R.542-43). In these
46

4. The district court appropriately awarded damages based on fees paid
to Pineview.
A senior right is “first in rights.” §73-3-1(5)(a). In an underground aquifer shared
with junior rights, therefore, the senior rights get the first water out of the ground. In other
words, the senior Appellee rights divert first in priority, before junior Pineview gets a drop.
Pineview’s #4 reversed that order. (R.407-09;P-Exs.23,24,26,27,29). Once it was clear to
the parties that #4 interfered, Pineview immediately connected Appellees so it could go
right on using #4. (R.397,505,1256-57). In exchange, Appellees paid a flat $20 monthly,
(R.397,505,550-51), a cheap rate that presumably accounted for the interference. When
Pineview changed that deal, Appellees sued, seeking to abate the interference and damages.
(R.505-06).54
Appellees were required to prove both the fact of damages and their amount. See
TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 2008 UT 81, ¶15. The “fact of damages” means “a
reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage.” Atkin Wright & Miles v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). Evidence for the amount

unchallenged facts are found multiple instances of interference: (1) the period of use, (2)
the quantity (0% from Arave and some negligible amount from SI, (R.397,399-401,40809;P-Exs.23,24,26,27,29,30), and (3) the diversion method—the wells either do not work
or barely work. Id. These facts added up to “obstructing or hindering the quantity or quality
of” “existing water right[s],” Wayment, ¶13; (R.409), and explain their connection to
Pineview. That’s exactly what happens when your cone of depression captures existing
wells—that “trouble” Laughlin helpfully described—pumping water to such a level as to
interfere with someone else’s right. (R.1122).
54
Appellees’ water rights add significant value to their properties. (See R.406). Without
water, land loses tremendous, sometimes all, value. See, e.g., Sanpete America v.
Willardsen, 2011 UT 48, ¶40, and cases cited, discussing water’s importance to land value.
Their water rights are appurtenant. See discussion at id. ¶¶36-48.
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must “provide[] a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages.”
TruGreen, ¶15.
Understanding the water right pecking order, the district court awarded Appellees
what they’ve paid Pineview for, in effect, their own water. (R.401-02,413,441).55 That is,
their senior rights gave them the first water out of these shared, fully appropriated aquifers.
Pineview’s deeper well took that water first, right out from under them, reversing priority
in fact, (R.407-09;P-Exs.23,24,26,27,29), thereby interfering with the priority stick.56
They did not pay for water before that, but they had to afterwards. They should not have
to pay for water they already appropriated and on which they have the senior call. Finally,
the district court’s award of damages for the hard water and related problems was entirely
appropriate. Just like their pre-#4 well use, they had no such problems before connecting.
(R.398,1223).57
CONCLUSION
The essential facts of this case could never be disputed. Pineview operated a new,
much bigger well too close to existing wells that divert senior rights. Finding clear
interference, the district court ordered a proportional remedy that faithfully honors those

Appellees do not “own” the water, of course; they own the right to use it, and their
priority puts them first in line. §73-3-1(5)(a).
56
“[P]riority in a water right is property in itself….[T]o deprive a person of” “priority is to
deprive” “a most valuable property right.” Colorado Water Cons. Brd. v. City of Central,
125 P.3d 424, 434 (Col. 2005)(citations omitted).
57
It was not Appellees’ burden to figure out why Pineview’s water caused their damage.
It just does. Neither do they control or even know which of the “multiple sources,”
(R.1237), Pineview uses at a given time.
55

48

facts. That remedy does no violence to groundwater law. It furthers it. This Court should
affirm.
August 21, 2018

MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES, PLLC
_____________________________
David C. Wright
John H. Mabey, Jr.
Counsel for Appellees
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ADDENDUMl

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 130907544
Page 1

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

Roger B Arave and Kimberly L
Arave, Janet Southwick,
Trustee, and Venture
Development Group, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM
DECISION
Civil No. 130907544
Judge Ernie W Jones

vs.
Pineview West Water
Company, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

This action was tried to the bench August 18, 19, and 29, with closing
arguments on September 25, 2017. Plaintiffs were represented by David C.
Wright. Defendants were represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Emily E. Lewis.
The parties also filed trial briefs. The court heard testimony from the witnesses,
including expert witnesses from both sides, and has reviewed the trial exhibits.
The court also heard argument from counsel. After the close of the evidence, the
court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Having listened to the testimony, reviewed the evidence, and applying the
law concerning water right interference and negligence, the court makes the
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following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The parties

1. Plaintiffs Roger B. Arave and Kimberly L. Arave, individuals and husband and
wife (referred to jointly as flAraves"), are joint tenant owners and residents of a
single family residential real property located in Weber County, with a street
address of 1364 North Highway 158, Eden, Utah.
2. Plaintiff Janet Southwick, Trustee, (sometimes referred to herein as
"Southwick"), is the sole owner and resident of certain single family residential
real property located in Weber County, with a street address of 1375 North
Highway 158, Eden, Utah.
3. Venture Development Group, LLC ("Venture"), owns certain improved real
property located in Weber County, with a street address of 1315 North Highway
158, Eden, Utah, which property is operated as a commercial bed-and-breakfast
known as the Snowberry Inn ("SI"). The Inn includes nine bedrooms and
bathrooms and two kitchens. SI also serves as the year-round residence for the
Inn operator, Andrea Burk.
4. Defendant Pineview West Water Company (flPWWC" or "Pineview") is a
private, Utah non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Eden,
Weber County, Utah. PWWC is regulated by the Public Service Commission. It
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operates multiple wells and other sources for its culinary and secondary
(irrigation) water delivery purposes.

B. The parties' wells
5. Three wells are at issue:
a. Plaintiffs Arave and Southwick share the Arave well, which was drilled
in 1963 (and cleaned out in 2013).
b. Venture Development owns the rights in the well operated by
Snowberry Inn, a bed and breakfast establishment near the Araves (liS I well"),
1

drilled in 2001 .

i. The 81 well operates with a cistern, which is a tank with a
functional capacity of between approximately 300 gallons and 500 gallons.
ii. The cistern contains level sensors. When the cistern drops below
a certain level, it triggers the SI well pump to turn on.
iii. The pump runs until a sensor signals that the cistern is full,
which then turns off the pump.
iv. Water is then pumped again, with a separate pump, into the Inn,
where it is held in two tanks, which then distribute the water throughout
the Inn.

I The current SI Well is a newer well. The original was drilled in 1960 and then
replaced in 2001
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v. Although the original Venture water right did not allow irrigation
use, the Inn irrigated approximately 4600 square feet of lawn and garden
around the structure.
vi. The 81 well pump is rated at 25 gallons per minute.
vii. The 81 and Arave wells are in hydrological communication.
viii. The 81 well pump was rated at 25 gallons per minute when
installed in 2001. The same pump is presently in the well.
ix. The 81 well, which replaced a previous well drilled in 1960, was
drilled into both the unconsolidated and bedrock aquifers, while the old
well was completed in just the unconsolidated aquifer.
c. The third well is PWWC's #4 Well (UPWWC #4," or just U#4"), drilled in
2004.
i. The #4 is approximately 700 feet from the Arave well and
approximately 460 feet from the 81 well.
ii. The Arave and 81 Wells are approximately 200 feet apart.
iii. PWWC #4 is used solely for secondary irrigation water.
iv. The current #4 pump is rated at 100 gallons per minute.

c. The parties' water rights
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6. Roger and Kimberly Arave own appurtenant water right 35-1483, which allows
them to divert from their well .015 cfs (approximately 6.7 gallons per minute) for
the needs of one home and two Iivestock. 2
7. Janet Southwick owns appurtenant water right 35-6733 (E1349) allowing her
to divert from the Arave well up to 1 acre-foot ("af') to irrigate .25 acres and for
the .indoor domestic needs of one home.
8. Prior to its shutdown and use as a monitoring well, the Arave well was the sole
source of culinary and secondary water for Araves and Southwick.
9. Venture Development owns the property and building where Snowberry Inn
operates. It owns two appurtenant water rights that were diverted from the SI
Well on its property:
a. Water right 35-1220 allows SI to divert .45 af, at the rate of .015 cubic
feet per second (Ucfs"), for single family domestic use.
b. Water right 35-13204 (E5647), acquired in March 2017, allows diversion
up to 2 af to irrigate .25 acres and 1.25 af of commercial use at the Inn.

2 "The standard unit of measurement of the flow of water shall be the discharge of
one cubic foot per second of time, which shall be known as a second-foot; and
the standard unit of measurement of the volume of water shall be the acre-foot,
being the amount of water upon an acre covered one foot deep, equivalent to
43,560 cubic feet." Utah Code §73-1-2. In these findings and conclusions, cubic
feet per second is abbreviated as "cfs," and acre-foot is abbreviated as "af."
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10. PWWC owns (among others) water right 35-11891 (E4625), allowing it
to divert 90 af annually for irrigation of 21.66 acres and the indoor domestic
requirements of 55 families ("PWWC Right").
a. In 2006, PWWC received State Engineer approval to divert this water
right from any combination of five wells, including #4.
b. That approval is, as all such approvals are under the law of prior
appropriation, "subject to prior rights."
11. PWWC right 35-7263 was modified by change application a27794,
approved in 2013, allowing PWWC to divert 78 af at .33 cfs from the same five
wells as E4625 (35-11891).3
12. PWWC can pump its water from anyone, or any combination, of the
five wells.
13. The parties' relative water right priorities are as follows:
a. Venture (SI) is October 10,1960.
b. Arave is October 14, 1963.
c. Southwick is August 25, 1978.
d. PWWC #4 is October 14, 2005.
14. Thus, all of plaintiffs' rights are senior to PWWC's Well #4 rights.

) The "E" designation included with the Southwick, SI, and PWWC rights indicates
simply that an exchange of water was approved. See Utah Code §73-3-20. The
exchanges themselves are not at issue.
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D. The local aquifers
15. There are two relevant local aquifers, an unconsolidated or alluvial aquifer,
which consists mostly of sand, gravel, and cobble, and a consolidated rock
aquifer, known as the Norwood Tuff.
16. Permeability is a measure of the ability of a porous material, such as rock or
an unconsolidated material, to allow fluids to pass through it.
17. The unconsolidated aquifer has much higher permeability than the Norwood,
which has generally poor permeability.
18. The Norwood can be fractured, which increases its permeability. The area
around the three wells at issue likely contains fracturing, but the intensity and
extent of fracturing are not determined.
19. There has not been a general decline in groundwater levels in the regional
basin in which these aquifers are located. There are, however, seasonal
fluctuations, with lower water levels in the late summer and early autumn,
followed by increasing water levels during recharge in the winter and spring.
20. Aquifer recharge depends primarily on the amount of water withdrawn by well
pumping and how quickly the aquifer begins to recharge with winter precipitation.

E. The effect of well pumping
21. Well pumping is a cause of seasonal discharge of water from an aquifer and
consequent groundwater decline in a given aquifer.
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22. When a well is drilled for production purposes, such as the three wells in this
case, its casing is perforated at one or more depths. Water enters the well from
the surrounding aquifer through these perforations, which supplies water to any
pumps in the wells, when turned on.
23. Water flows from high pressure to low pressure or, in other words, from high
head to low head.
24. When a well is pumped, the water level drops and a pOint of low pressure is
created at the depth of the perforations in the well casing, which is at its
maximum at the location of the pump itself. This has the effect of causing the
water in the aquifer to draw down, flowing toward the pump or lower pressure.
25. The pumping thus creates a zone of low pressure, resulting in a cone of
depression, usefully described as follows in Bingham

v. Roosevelt City, 2010 UT

37, 113, 235 P.3d 730:
The underground area of reduced soil saturation is in the shape of an
inverted cone, with the point of the cone extending downward toward the point at
which the water is extracted. Accordingly, the depth of the water table will be
most significantly impacted at the point of extraction, but even as one moves
away from this point, the water table will be lower than it otherwise might be.
Therefore, the effects on the water table are apparent even on parcels of land
that are not immediately adjacent to the wells.
26. A cone of depression creates a "radius of influence," a zone that is measured
from the well outward and represents an area within a given aquifer that is
dewatered due to well pumping.
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27. An illustration of a simple cone of depression and a radius of influence is
depicted below. This drawing is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended
to depict any particular cone of depression from any well in this case. (Cf. Pitt.
Trial Exhibit 52).

28. The shape and reach of a cone of depression depends on several factors,
such as the nature, depth, and permeability of the surrounding aquifer(s).

29. The Arave Well is 187 feet deep. Its perforations are from 140 to 170 feet
deep, entirely in the Norwood Tuff.

30. The original 81 well, drilled in 1960 and replaced in 2001, was 120 feet deep.
When it was abandoned, its static water level was at 55 feet from the top of the
well casing. That well was drilled into the unconsolidated aquifer.

31. The current 81 Well is 133 feet deep. Its perforations are from 105 to 125 feet
deep, and are in both the unconsolidated aquifer and the Norwood Tuff. When
drilled, its static water level was at 54 feet from the top of the well casing, which
is one foot higher in water level than the original well.

32. The 81 well likely gets the majority of its water from the unconsolidated
aquifer but is hydrologically connected to the Norwood Tuff aquifer. The new well
had a specific capacity during the initial pump test, much higher than the old well,
which was exclusively completed in unconsolidated deposits.

33. PWWC #4 is 738 feet deep. It has four perforated zones. Zone 1 is from 58 to
98 feet deep, which zone is divided between the unconsolidated aquifer and the
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Nerweed Tuff. Zene 2 is frem 208 to. 228 feet deep. Zene 3 is from 408 to. 448
feet deep, and Zene 4 is 648 to. 738 feet deep. Zones 2-4 are entirely within the
Nerweod Tuff.
34. Beth the Arave and SI wells lie within the cone ef depression and the radius
ef influence created by pumping PWWC #4.
35. When #4 was first pump-tested, interference with the Arave well, expressed
as a drop in the water level sufficient to. leave the pump in the Arave well witheut
water, was quickly neted by the Araves, and the test was stepped.
36. Later, after #4 was turned en again, the interference returned, first at the
Arave well and later at the SI Well.
37. PWWC put well #4 well into. eperatien, and the effect en the Arave well was
again neticed within a shert time. The Arave well was unable to. preduce any
water when #4 was pumped. Because ef this interference, PWWC cennected the
Araves to. the PWWC culinary system in 2007.
38. The SI well also. began to. struggle to. preduce water in September, 2007.
Because the SI well ceuld net fill the cistern, the SI eperators, the Dehrers, were
ferced to. use a hese to. cennect to. the Arave heme and fill the Inn cistern with
PWWC water ebtained frem the Arave cennectien.
39. Later, in 2007, the Inn was also. cennected to. the PWWC system because its
well ceuld no. lenger meet its water needs.
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40. The Araves, Southwick, and Sl originally were offered and accepted an
arrangement with PWWC under which they would pay a flat rate of $20.00 per
month for PWWC culinary water. Later, in 2012, PWWC unilaterally increased
that amount to PWWC's standard tariff rates, which plaintiffs have paid each year
since.
41. The Araves have paid $7,003 to PWWC for water service. Southwick has
paid $4,782. Venture has paid $19,839.
42. PWWC #4 is turned on typically around July 1 of each year and is pumped
through the remainder of the irrigation season, ending in late summer/early fall.
43. Once hooked up to PWWC's water system, the Araves removed the pump
from their well and have used the well as a monitoring well to document the
impact of pumping #4 for several years.
44. The use of the Arave well as a monitoring well has facilitated the parties'
ability to gather data concerning the effect of PWWC #4. Had the Araves
attempted to pump at the same time that PWWC #4 was pumped, the data would
have been more difficult to interpret.
45. The fact that the Arave Well has not been pumped has allowed good data
collection to determine the impact of PWWC #4.
46. The Arave Well is a very good surrogate for PWWC #4, meaning that it reacts
. quickly and accurately to pumping in the #4.

0397

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 130907544
Page 12

47. Prior to the introduction of PWWC #4, neither the Araves (including
Southwick) nor SI had any well or water availability or well pumping issues or
problems in their current wells. The Arave and SI wells produced water
year-round to satisfy the Arave, Southwick, and SI (Venture Dev.) water rights
and uses.
48. In March of 2017, Venture Development acquired 2 acre-feet of additional
water by virtue of an approved Exchange with Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District. This additional water is approved for irrigation of .25 acres and
year-round commercial purposes for the Inn.
49. Prior to acquiring its additional 2 af under water right 35-13204 (E5647), SI
used in a typical year more water than permitted by its original water right, and it
used that water for irrigating its lawn and garden even though the water right is
not authorized for irrigation uses.
50. During the three years prior to trial, SI used approximately .33 af of its total
.45 acre foot right (prior to the Exchange (E5647)) in the months before PWWC

#4 was turned on.
51. The prior SI operators, the Dohrers, kept a record of well use versus PWWC
culinary water use. Patrick Dohrer explained how he alternated between using SI
well water and PWWC culinary water after SI was connected to the PWWC
culinary system by turning certain valves inside the Inn.
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52. The Dohrer SI well versus PWWC water use record was not perfectly kept. It
showed no SI well use during a time in approximately late August to early
September 2014 when the SI well was actually being used. That well use during
that period is depicted on plaintiffs' Exhibits 26 and 27.

53. PWWC also kept a record of its #4 well use, but that record also was not
entirely accurate.
54. These errors in record keeping by the Dohrers and by PWWC were
inadvertent. No bad faith or improper motive is found in connection with those
errors.4

55. Andrea Burk took over SI operations in 2014. She explained how she
understood that valve system to work, but her understanding was incorrect. She
did not understand how that valve system worked until it was shown to her during
the trial.
56. When PWWC #4 starts pumping the Arave well head begins to fall within
hours. When the elevation of the Arave well head falls below the elevation of the
SI well head, some water moves downward and away from the SI well
unconsolidated aquifer toward the lower elevation of head now present in the

For example, it is clear that the SI well was pumped during the late August to
early September 2014 time frame because plaintiffs' expert, Paul Anderson,
collected SI pumping head (i.e. water elevation) data during that period, which
data is depicted on plaintiffs' Exhibits 26 and 27. There was no way to collect
such data unless the SI well was being pumped.

4

0399

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 130907544
Page 14

Norwood Tuff, essentially draining some of the water away from the
unconsolidated aquifer and causing the head in the SI well to drop.
57. As PWWC #4 continues to pump, it continues to draw down the level of the
Arave well due to the deepening and widening cone of depression, created by
pumping this deeper and higher volume well. The SI well clearly lies within this
deep and wide cone of depression; hence, water moves from higher head in the
SI well's aquifers to the lower head created by the #4 deepening cone in the
Norwood Tuff. The result is that the SI well head drops, and the well struggles to
produce even a minimal yield.
58. In the winter-late spring of each year, the head in the Arave well is
consistently higher in elevation (as shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 27) than the SI
well.
a. Water moves from high to low head, indicating that water monitored in
the Norwood Tuff, at the Arave well, is moving upward toward the water
monitored in the SI well, which is perforated in both the unconsolidated and
Norwood Tuff aquifers.
b. When this head relationship between the Arave and SI exists, there is
no problem for the SI well to quickly fill and re-fill the Inn's cistern as
demonstrated in Plaintiffs Exhibits 26 and 27.
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c. It is when this Arave - 51 head level reverses-when the normally
higher Arave head drops below the normally lower 51 head-that the 51 well is
most noticeably affected. Its water level drops dramatically at that point.
59. PWWC #4's interference with the 81 well is illustrated in plaintiffs' Exhibit 23.
The graphs on that exhibit show that in December the 51 well recovers quickly,
filling the cistern within fifteen minutes. During August, when PWWC #4 is
pumping, the 81 well struggles for hours to fill the cistern.
60. The Arave and 51 wells coexisted without interfering with each other.
61. After PWWC #4 stops pumping, recovery time for the water levels in the
Arave and 81 wells depends on the factors described above-how much #4
pumps and how quickly the aquifer is recharged.
62. The PWWC right is evidenced by an underlying Bureau of Reclamation water
right, 35-7397, which has a 1930 priority.
63. In 2006, PWWC obtained approval to move the point of diversion of its water
right to a complex of five wells, including #4, subject to prior rights.
64. The PWWC water delivered to plaintiffs after PWWC connected them to its
system caused damage in the form of hard water deposits and build-up, requiring
certain repairs and maintenance by each of the plaintiffs.
65. The Araves pump was damaged due to PWWC interference.

F. Damages
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66. Araves incurred damages proximately caused by reason of PWWC's
pumping of its well #4 in the form of (a) fees paid to PWWC for the water
connection to PWWC's system necessitated by PWWC's interference with the
Arave well, in the amount of $7,003; (b) the cost of a new pump and associated
accessories estimated at $4,500.
67. Southwick incurred damages proximately caused by reason of PWWC's
pumping of its well #4 in the form of (a) fees paid to PWWC for the water
connection to PWWC's system necessitated by PWWC's interference with the
Arave well, in the amount of $4,782, (b) expenses incurred by reason of the hard
water problems and related issues in the amount of $1 ,000, for total damages in
the amount of $5,782.5
68. Venture incurred damages proximately caused by reason of PWWC's
pumping of its well #4 in the form of (a) fees paid to PWWC for the water
connection to PWWC's system necessitated by PWWC's interference with the SI
well, in the amount of $19,839; expenses incurred by reason of the hard water
problems and related issues in the amount of $8,399, for total damages in the
amount of $28,238.
69. Patrick and Sherrie Dohrer operated SI from August 2005 to approximately
August 2014, and during that time incurred certain costs and expenses caused

S Southwick also lost several trees and a garden due to the inability to irrigate
after connection to the PWWC system. No value was placed on these items,
however.
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by or related to interference with the 81 well. Those expenses total $10,538.83,
and are identified in plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Dohrers assigned the claim for those
expenses to Venture on May 31,2016. That figure is included in the foregoing
Venture damages calculation.
70. All of the parties' water uses are for beneficial purposes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The court has personal jurisdiction over the parties.
2. The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
§78A-5-1 02(1).
3. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code §78B-3-301 inasmuch as the real
property and water rights at issue in this matter are located in Weber County,
Utah.
A. Water Right Interference

4. A determination of interference is a mixed question of fact and law. See

Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ~9, 144 P.3d 1147. The court "must first find
facts regarding the claim of interference and then determine whether those facts
are within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue." Id.
5. Water is public property, "subject to all existing rights to the use thereof." Utah
Code §73-1-1(1).
6. Beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right. Utah Code
§73-1-3.
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7. The law of prior appropriation means that senior water rights have priority over
junior rights. Prior appropriation applies always and everywhere to protect senior
rights. U[S]enior water right holders are entitled to their full water right before
junior water right holders are entitled to any water." Heal Utah

v.

Kane Cnty. etc.,

2016 UT App 153, ~6, 378 P.3d 1246).
8. Water rights are real property. Utah Code §57-1-1(3)("Real property" or "real
estate" means any right, title, estate, or interest in land ... and all water rights ..

...
")
9. No one may diminish, obstruct or interfere with the approved water rights of
another. See North

v.

Marsh, 504 P.2d 1378, 1379 and n.2 (Utah 1973).

10. Interference means to obstruct or hinder. See Black's Law Dictionary 831-32
(8th ed. 2004). Specifically, in Utah water law, "obstructing or hindering the
quantity or quality of an existing water right constitutes interference." Wayment,
2006 UT

56,~

13 (citations omitted). See also Bingham, 2010 UT 37,

~48.

11. "Because underground waters cannot be observed nor measured with
precision, but must be determined on the basis of geology, physics and
hydrology, there are greater difficulties involved in their allocation and regulation
than with respect to surface waters." Wayman

v. Murray City, 458 P.2d 861, 863

(Utah 1969).
12. A water right consists of several constituent elements, which when taken
together define a right to the use of water. Those elements include (i) quantity,
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either or both in terms of volume (measured in acre-feet) and flow rate
(measured in cubic feet per second), (ii) purpose of use, (iii) place of use, (iv)
pOint of diversion, (v) time during which the water may be used, (vi) the source
from which the water is diverted (either above or below ground), and (vii) priority
date. See, e.g., Utah Code §73-3-17(1).
13. A water right also includes an appropriator's right to continue use of the
"existing and historical method of diverting the water." Wayment, 2006 UT 56,
11'13. Here, plaintiffs' water rights are diverted solely by means of their wells.
14. Protection of a senior right extends to the source. "No one can interfere with
the source of supply of [a water right], regardless of how far it may be from the
place of use, and whether it flows on the surface or underground, in such a
manner as will diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of the water of
these established rights." Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d
440,443 (Utah 1953).6
15. The timing of water right use is protected. When implementing a change in
the use of water, as PWWC did here when it moved water rights to its #4 well, it

See also Justesen v. Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1935)("From the beginning
of our history, when a man went upon a stream of water, diverted it, and applied it
to a beneficial use, his right to the use of that stream was recognized as being
prior and superior to the rights of all subsequent appropriators to the extent of the
reasonable necessities of the ... first appropriation. During the progress of our
development, as new conditions presented themselves from time to time our
courts have consistently enforced this right of priority and protected appropriators
not only as against all subsequent claimants taking water from the body of the
stream, but as against all persons interfering with its source.").
6
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must ensure that senior rights are not harmed. "This requires that the vested
rights of the lower users shall not be impaired by such changes either by
reducing the flow of water ... or by changing the time of such flow to theU
detriment [of senior rights]." East Bench Irr. Co.

v.

Deseret Irr. Co., 271 P.2d 449,

453 (Utah 1954). 7
16. Plaintiffs' water rights are essential to their properties. The Araves and
Southwick live there and, until being interfered with, depended on their water
rights and the Arave well as the sole source of their culinary and secondary
water.
17. The SI well and water rights also add significant value to Venture's property.
18. Without water, land loses tremendous, sometimes all, value. See, e.g.,
Sanpete America

v.

Willardsen, 2011 UT 48,1140,269 P.3d 118, and cases cited

(discussing water's importance to land value).
19. This action concerns groundwater and local well interference. The "rule of
reasonableness" governs groundwater interference. Wayman, 458 P.2d at 866.
20. Plaintiffs' and PWWC's respective water rights should be addressed under
this "rule of reasonableness" to balance plaintiffs' senior water rights with
PWWC's junior rights.

See a/so Logan, Hyde Park, etc. v. Logan City, 269 P. 776, 778 (Utah 1928)(city
"perpetually" enjOined from "operating its diverting works and power plant as to
impound, obstruct, or impede in any manner the free and natural flow of the
water of the river to which the [senior appropriators were] entitled ... ).

7
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21. This requires analysis of the circumstances: the quantity of water available,
the average annual recharge in the basin, the existing rights, and their priorities.
Wayman, 458 P.2d at 865.

22. All water users are required where necessary to "employ reasonable and
efficient means in taking their own waters in relation to others to the end that
wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest amount of available water is
put to beneficial use." Wayman, 458 P.2d at 865.
23. Wayman means essentially that, when rights clash, the court invokes reason

so that, as far as possible, water is developed for beneficial use. s
24. PWWC's #4 rights are junior in priority to plaintiffs' rights.
25. Between appropriators, the one first in time is first in rights. Utah Code
§73-3-1 (5)(a).
26. Accordingly, "senior water right holders are entitled to their full water right
before junior water right holders are entitled to any water." Heal Utah

v.

Kane

Cnty. Water Ganserv. Dist., 2016 UT App 153, 'f6, 378 P.3d 1246 (citation

omitted).
27. No junior appropriator may interfere, directly or indirectly, with senior rights.
Rasmussen

v.

Moroni Irr. Co., 189 P. 572, 577 (Utah 1920)("The first appropriator

The "inquiry regarding interference focuses on actual interference in the quantity
or quality of water to which the prior appropriator is entitled." Salt Lake City v.
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 'f 28 n.10, 5 P.3d 1206, abrogated on
other grounds by Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co.,
2009 UT 16, 'f'f 11-13, 203 P.3d 1015.
8
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on the stream ... acquires a prior right to the use of all those waters, and no
subsequent appropriator may interfere either directly or indirectly with the rights
of the prior appropriator.").9
28. Plaintiffs' means and method of diverting their water are reasonable. Their
wells are the only possible method for diverting the water under their rights.
Those wells functioned without problem until PWWC #4 was drilled.
29. The PWWC change of its junior water rights to well #4, as all such changes
are, was approved "subject to prior rights." Utah Code §73-3-17(6).
30. The priority of the underlying right survives the change unless it interferes
with other rights. Hague v. Nephi Irr. Co., 52 P. 765, 769 (Utah 1898)("When
water has been lawfully appropriated the priority acquired is not lost by changing
the use for which was first appropriated and applied, or the place at which it was
first employed, provided that the alterations made are not injurious to the rights
acquired by others prior to the change.")
31. PWWC's pumping of its well #4 interferes with the Arave well, thus interfering
with the senior Arave water rights.

Moroni Irr. continues: "If .. . the appellant may cut off one of the sources of
supply ... any other landowner and water user may cut off another source of
supply, and so on until all the sources of supply which pass underneath the
surface of the soil are cut off, and thus the lower and prior appropriator would be
left without any, or at least only a meager, supply of water in the low-water
season. This may not legally be done." 189 P. at 577.
9
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32. PWWC's pumping of its well #4 interferes with the Arave well, thus interfering
with the senior Southwick water rights.

33. PWWC's pumping of its well #4 interferes with the SI well, thus interfering
with the senior Venture water rights.

34. PWWC's interference consists of dewatering the aquifers that are the source
of supply for the Arave and 81 wells, thus obstructing and hindering the quantity
of water available to the Arave and SI wells, first by depriving the Arave well of
virtually all water, and by obstructing the SI well's ability to produce water.

35. Because that change in PWWC's point of diversion interferes with the senior
Arave, Southwick, and Venture Development rights, the original priority of the
PWWC rights is lost.
36. The PWWC #4, Arave and SI wells cannot co-exist under these
circumstances.

B.Negligence
37. PWWC owes each plaintiff a duty of reasonable care to others foreseeably
harmed by the method PWWC uses to obtain its water. See Bingham, 2010 UT
37,1J65 (City owed "a duty of reasonable care to landowners who will foreseeably
be harmed" by the method the city used to obtain its water.").

38. PWWC breached that duty when it located, drilled, and used its #4 well in a
manner that interferes with plaintiffs' wells.
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39. Such interference was foreseeable given the close proximity to plaintiffs'
wells, the much larger capacity of PWWC #4, and its depth and perforated zones
in the aquifers used by the Arave and SI wells.
40. The harm to plaintiffs' wells is proximately caused by PWWC's pumping of its
well #4.
41. Plaintiffs have been damaged by reason of PWWC's negligence as identified
above.

C. Plaintiffs' water use is not a defense to local well Interference.
42. The fact that, historically, SI (or any other plaintiff) has or may have use,d
more water than permitted by its water right is not a defense to local well
interference. Neither is it a defense that SI used water for irrigation when it did
not then have an irrigation right.
43. The amount of water used under an approved water right, and the manner in
which it is used, is a matter between the State (the Utah Division of Water Rights
and the Utah State Engineer) and the water user. Utah Code §73-3-17(1)(b). The
State Engineer has enforcement powers to remedy such matters.
44. Even if SI used water only within its water right limit, and even if used only for
indoor, domestic purposes for a single family, PWWC's pumping of its #4 well
would still interfere with Venture's water right because it interferes with both the
source, by dewatering the aquifer from which Venture's senior right is drawn, and
the SI well, thus interfering with Venture's means and method of diversion. The
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interference would be the same even if SI used less than its full water right
because the interference affects the SI (and Arave) well's ability to produce water
as needed on a year-round basis.
45. Use of water pursuant to a water right is regulated by the Utah State
Engineer, who has enforcement powers pursuant to Utah Code §73-2-25 if water
is used without the right to do so, or beyond an eXisting right. 10
46. Furthermore, if a senior water right user exceeds the limit of its right, thus
taking more water from a source than is authorized, then a junior water right user
on the same source (whether on the surface or underground) could have an
interference claim because the excess water used by the senior user should be
available to satisfy junior rights. PWWC brought no such claim.
D. Remedies
47. The PWWC #4, Arave, and SI wells cannot coexist under PWWC's current
pumping routine.
a. Pumping in #4 first depletes the water in the Arave well, causing its
water level to drop below the SI water level, which reverses the pressure
gradient, in turn causing the SI well level to drop.
b. Accordingly, PWWC's pumping of #4 must either be stopped or
curtailed sufficiently to permit the Arave and SI wells to function.

JO u[T]he state engineer may commence an enforcement action ... if [he] finds
that a person ... is diverting, impounding or using water in violation of an existing
water right .... " Utah Code §73-2-25(2)(a).
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c. Under Wayman's rule of reasonableness, the court must try to find a
remedy that allows PWWC to use as much water as it can without interfering with
the Arave and SI wells.
d. PWWC owns other wells authorized for use under the same approval
that permitted it to pump water from #4.
e. PWWC is ordered to stop pumping #4 and use one or more of its other
wells to satiSfy its irrigation demand.
f. The court retains jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining
whether it can be shown that PWWC #4 can be pumped at a lesser rate so as
not to interfere with the Arave and SI wells, and specifically to prevent the Arave
head from dropping below the SI head. If so, then PWWC #4 may continue to
function under those circumstances.

i. If PWWC #4 can be pumped at a level or rate that does not
interfere with the Arave and SI wells, then PWWC shall install a flow meter
pursuant to Utah Code §73-5-4. That meter shall be accessible by the
state engineer pursuant to §73-5-4(2). PWWC shall further report its
pumping data to the state engineer in a manner acceptable to the state
engineer, and such pumping data shall be provided to plaintiffs on a
weekly basis while #4 is pumped.
ii. If PWWC #4 cannot be pumped at a level or rate that does not
interfere with the Arave and SI wells, the court may order that PWWC
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provide replacement water pursuant to Utah Code §73-3-23 at PWWC's
sole expense. See Current Creek Irf. Co. v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528, 531
(Utah 1959)("[Junior appropriators] can appropriate water to a beneficial
use from the underground basin if it is available but they must replace the
flow of the wells and springs at the prior appropriator's place of diversion
solely at their own cost.").
iii. Should PWWC shift any of its well pumping to anyone or more
of its other approved wells, those wells must be pump tested first to
determine whether there is any impact to or interference with either the
Arave or 81 wells.
48. PWWC is ordered to pay damages as follows: Araves $11,503, Southwick
$5,782, and Venture Development $28,238, plus post-judgment interest on each
of these amounts at the statutory rate pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4.
49. As the prevailing parties, plaintiffs are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in an amount to be set forth in a
Verified Memorandum of Costs.
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E. Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 52(a)(1), a separate judgment consistent with this
Memorandum Decision will be entered. Plaintiff will prepare the judgment and
submit it to the court for signature.

Dated this

4-

day of November, 2017.

~~1o--~ie W. Jones ~
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of November 2017, I sent a true
and correct copy of the foregoing decision to counsel as follows:

John H Mabey, Jr, David C Wright, Melinda L Hill
Mabey Wright & James, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
175 South Main Suite 1330
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Edwin C Barnes, Emily E Lewis, Jonathan S Clyde
Clyde Snow & Sessions
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street 13th Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2216
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: January 04, 2018
/s/ Ernie
05:08:41 PM

John H. Mabey, Jr. - 4625
David C. Wright - 5566
MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES, PLLC
175 South Main, # 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-359-3663
Facsimile: 801-359-3673
Email: jmabey@mwjlaw.com
dwright@mwilaw.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SECOND DISTRlCT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

ROGER B. ARA VE and KIMBERLY L.
ARAVE, JANET SOUTHWICK, Trustee,
and VENTURE DEVELOPMENT GROUP,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company;

FINAL JUDGMENT

Case No. 130907544

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Judge Ernest W. Jones

PINEVIEW WEST WATER COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant.

This action was tried to the bench August 18, 19, and 29, with closing arguments on
September 25, 2017.

Plaintiffs were represented by David C. Wright.

Defendants were

represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Emily E. Lewis. The palties also filed trial briefs. The
court heard testimony from the witnesses, including expelt witnesses from both sides, and has
reviewed the trial exhibits. The court also heard argument from counsel. After the close of the
evidence, the court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
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which they did on September 21 , 2017.

The COUlt entered its Memorandum Decision on

November 14,2017, instructing plaintiffs to prepare a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 52(a)
(1) to be entered under Rule 58A.
Consistent with the COUlt's Memorandum Decision, the COUlt enters this Final Judgment
as follows:
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs, and each of them, and against Pineview
West Water Company ("PWWC"), on plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief for common law
interference with water rights.
a. PWW C is ordered to stop pumping its Well #4 (State of Utah Well Identification
No. 28707) and use one or more of its other wells to satisfy its irrigation demand.
b. The COUlt retains jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining whether it
can be shown that PWWC #4 can be pumped at a lesser rate so as not to interfere
with plaintiffs' wells (State of Utah Well Identification Nos. 11238 (Arave Well)
and 11242 (Venture Development Well), and specifically to prevent the Arave
head from dropping below the SI head. If so, then PWWC #4 may continue to
function under those circumstances.
i.If PWWC #4 can be pumped at a level or rate that does not interfere with
plaintiffs' wells, then PWWC shall install a flow meter pursuant to Utah
Code §73-5-4.

That meter shall be accessible by the state engineer

pursuant to §73-5-4(2). PWWC shall further report its pumping data to
the state engineer in a manner acceptable to the state engineer, and such
pumping data shall be provided to plaintiffs on a weekly basis while #4 is
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pumped.
ii.If PWWC #4 cannot be pumped at a level or rate that does not interfere
with plaintiffs' wells, the COUlt may order that PWWC provide
replacement water pursuant to Utah Code §73-3-23 at PWWC's sole
expense.
iii. Should PWWC shift any of its well pumping to anyone or more of its
other approved wells (including but not limited to Well Identification Nos.
11248, 11249,427479), those wells must be pump tested first to determine
whether there is any impact to or interference with either the Arave or
Venture Development wells.
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs, and each of them, and against PWWC,
on plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief for negligence.
3. Damages against PWWC are awarded on plaintiffs' First and Second Claims as follows:
a. Roger and Kimberly Arave: $11,503, plus post-judgment interest at the statutory
rate pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4.
b. Janet Southwick, Trustee: $5,782, plus post-judgment interest at the statutory rate
pursuant to Utah Code §15-1-4.
c. Venture Development Group, LLC: $28,238, plus post-judgment interest at the
statutory rate pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4.
4. As prevailing parties, plaintiffs are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in an amount to be set fOlth in a Verified Memorandum of
Costs.
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5. The court's limited retention of jurisdiction in aid of this Judgment in
affect its fmality.

~l.b.

does not

All of the claims and the patties ' respective rights have been

determined. Accordingly, there is no just reason for delay of entry of this Final Judgment
as to all of the claims and all of the parties.
--------------------End of Judgment-------------------Comt's e-signature at top of first page

Approved as to Form:
Edwin C. Barnes (e-signature wi permission)
Edwin C. Barnes
Emily E. Lewis
Counsel for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on December 19, 2017, the foregoing Final Judgment was served via EFiling system to the following:
Edwin C. Barnes - ecb@clydesnow.com
Emily E. Lewis - eel@clydesnow.com
Clyde Snow & Sessions
201 South Main Street, 13 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
David C. Wright
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John H. Mabey, J1'. - 4625
David C. Wright - 5566

PLLC
175 South Main, # 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-359-3663
Facsimile: 801-359-3673
Email: jmabey@mwjlaw.com
dwright@mwilaw.com
MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES,

Counsel for Plaintiffs
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

ROGER B. ARA VE and KIMBERL Y L.
ARA VE, JANET SOUTHWICK, Trustee,
and VENTURE DEVELOPMENT GROUP,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company;

AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

Case No. 130907544

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Judge Ernest W. Jones

PINEVIEW WEST WATER COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant.

This action was tried to the bench August 18, 19, and 29, with closing arguments on
September 25, 2017.

Plaintiffs were represented by David C. Wright.

Defendants were

represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Emily E. Lewis. The patiies also filed trial briefs. The
comi heard testimony from the witnesses, including expeli witnesses from both sides, and has
reviewed the trial exhibits. The court also heard argument from counsel. After the close of the
evidence, the court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
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which they did on September 21, 2017.

The cOUli entered its Memorandum Decision on

November 14, 2017, instructing plaintiffs to prepare a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 52(a)
(1) to be entered under Rule 58A.
Consistent with the couti's Memorandum Decision, the court amends paragraph 4 of its
Final Judgment as follows:
As prevailing parties, plaintiffs are awarded costs in the amount of $2,059.96 pursuant to
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

--------------------End of Judgment-------------------Court's e-signature at top of first page
Approved as to Form:

Edwin C. Barnes (e-signature wi permission)
Edwin C. Barnes
Emily E. Lewis
Counsel for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on January 8,2017, the foregoing Amended Final Judgment was served via
E-Filing system to the following:
Edwin C. Barnes - ecb@c1ydesnow.com
Emily E. Lewis - eel@clydesnow.com
Clyde Snow & Sessions
201 South Main Street, 13 tll Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216

David C. Wright
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Area 35 Water Rights Policies

•

Services

Agencies
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AREA 35 - WEBER AND OGDEN RIVERS
Updated: April 3, 2018
Recent changes and additions in red text

MANAGEMENT
The 1937 Weber River Decree and the 1948 Ogden River Decree adjudicated the area's surface
water rights prior to those dates. No adjudications have been ordered to update these decrees or
include ground-water rights. There are two state-administered distribution systems in this area: the
Weber River Distribution System and the Ogden River Distribution System. Parts of the area are
also subject to the conditions of two groundwater management plans: the Groundwater
Management Plan for the Weber Delta Sub-Area, and the State Engineer's Interim Policy for
Snyderville and the Park City Basin . Click here to see statistics for this area.

SOURCES
Surface Water - Surface waters are considered to be fully appropriated. Diligence Claims may be
filed on water uses not in the decrees and which were established prior to 1903 for surface water
and 1935 for underground water. New diversions and consumptive uses in these sources must be
accomplished by change applications filed on owned or acquired rights . Non-consumptive use
applications, such as hydroelectric power generation , will be considered on their individual merits.
Fixed period or transient projects in canyon or foothill areas must be handled by temporary change
applications. Per the State Engineer's Public Meeting Response Letter dated October 26, 2004,
new water diversions, based on exchange applications, will be permitted for those projects where
there is water available in the proposed source that can be diverted without impairing the rights of
others or where water can be released from upstream storage to directly compensate intervening
rights that might be impaired.
Per the State Engineer's Public Meeting Response Letter dated October 28, 2011 :
• Exchange applications will continue to be considered on their own merit. New water diversions,
based on exchange applications, will be permitted for projects where there is water available in the
proposed source that can be diverted without impairing the existing rights on the source, and
where water can be released under the exchange to replace water for downstream rights.
• New water diversions, based on exchange applications, that might impact tributary streams that
are fully diverted under existing water rights may need a study provided by the applicant. This
study will need to demonstrate that the groundwater being developed does not contribute to the
flow of a surface source that does not receive a full year supply, which cannot be compensated
directly by releases from upstream storage. The need for a study will be determined on a case-bycase basis.

4 -[ - )-
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Policy area in green,
click on the map for more detail

DESCRIPTION
This area includes the main stem of the
Ogden River and its tributaries (North ,
Middle, and South Forks) in Weber
County and the main stem of the Weber
River and its tributaries (Beaver Creek,
East Canyon Creek, Chalk Creek, Heiners
Creek, Lost Creek, and Cottonwood
Creek) in Weber, Morgan, and western
Summit Counties.
Click for Interactive Map

I

Ground Water - There is a limited ground-water resource available. No new appropriations are
approved above the mouths of the canyons. Development of new or different consumptive use
projects in these areas must be accomplished by change applications on owned or acquired rights .
New appropriations below the canyons are reviewed on an individual basis. Individual domestic
filings for 1.0 acre-foot per year are generally approved where a public water supply is not
accessible . Larger projects are generally held pending development of approved rights and data
from water users. Changes from surface to underground sources, and vice versa , are also
considered on their individual merits, with emphasis on their potential to interfere with existing
rights and to ensure that there is no enlargement of the underlying rights . Applicants are placed on
notice that development should be pursued as soon as possible. Extension of time requests will be
critically reviewed beyond the initial five year period . Per the State Engineer's Public Meeting
Response Letter dated October 26, 2004, the aquifer test requirement on new wells in the Kamas
East Subdivision has been removed .
Approvals based on irrigation company stock or leases generally contain conditions requiring
maintenance of shares or contracts for the underlying changed rights and/or installation of
measuring devices. In some instances, further limitations are imposed as follows :
• Snyderville/Park City Sub-basin : Only change or exchange applications based on rights already
approved within this boundaries of this sub-basin are approved. See the management plan
referenced above for more details.
• Samak Area: Changes on shares of stock in Beaver and Shingle Creek Irrigation Company are
subject to evaluation of the shares at 0.3 acres of irrigation per share , maintenance of those
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shares, installation of measuring devices, and the restriction of irrigation at the new diversion to the
same period in which water is available in the original canal system.
• Garff Ranch/Kamas Area : The State Engineer's policy for this area was changed on Apri l 3,
2018. Exchanges based on contracts with Weber Basin Water Conservancy District are limited to
1.0 acre-feet at a time . Whereas the prior policy restricted certa in lots to indoor domestic use only,
the new policy has no restrictions on nature of use. See the following :
• State Engineer's Policy Letter
• Public Meeting Notice and Materials
• Presentation Slides from Public Meeting
• West Hoytsville Area: The West Hoytsville groundwater system is characterized by fractured
volcanic rock. Fracture density appears to decrease with depth . Wells typically have low yields and
can interfere with each other if the same fracture system is intercepted . Residents in the area are
currently exploring alternatives to organize a community water system. The Summit County
economic development director has requested he be contacted regarding the filing of additional
exchange applications in the area. His email addressis dsargent@co.summit.ut.us

GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLANS
• Effective October 31, 1995, the East Shore Area is is subject to the conditions of the
Groundwater Management Plan for the Weber Delta Sub-Area. Monitoring of groundwater levels
indicated general declines over the entire sub-area. Lands previously devoted to irrigated
agriculture are being converted to commercial and residential uses. This plan can , hopefully,
provide a framework for the orderly and efficient development of ground-water supplies while
minimizing such attendant problems as well interference, contamination, and over-utilization.
Contamination concerns near Hill Air Force Base are also addressed.
• Effective February 9, 1999, the Snyderville and Park City Basin is subject to the conditions of
the State Engineer's Interim Policy. The management plan was developed in response to rapid
population growth in the area to maintain the viability and sustainability of the resource. Primary
water uses have rapidly transformed from mining and agriculture to residential, commercial, and
industrial needs.

STATISTICS FOR CURRENT EXCHANGE APPLICATIONS
Ogden River
Weber River

GENERAL
Applications are advertised in the Ogden Standard-Examiner, the Morgan County News, the
Summit County Bee , or the Park City Record. Filings that may involve the diversion of water in
Utah for use in Wyoming (export) would be subject to the special criteria the statutes require for
such projects. The general irrigation diversion duty for this area, which the State Engineer uses for
evaluation purposes, is 4.0 acre-feet per acre per year (af/ac) in valley regions of western Weber
County and 3.0 aflac in the canyons and upper valleys. The consumptive use requirements are
determined from the publication Consumptive Use of Irrigated Crops in Utah , Research Report
145, Utah State University, 1994, unless the applicant submits other data for consideration . This
area is administered by the Weber River Regional Office in Salt Lake City.
Other requirements
The Water Right applicant is strongly cautioned that other permits may be required before any
physical development of a project can begin and it is the responsibility of the applicant to determine
the applicability of and acquisition of such permits. In order to avoid delays and ensure that Water
Right approvals conform to applicable local ordinances, applicants should contact local
governmental entities in advance to determine what ordinances are in place that affect the
proposed project and to make sure that Water Right filings conform to those ordinances. The
approval of a Water Right application does not imply any approval of a project by any other
governmental entity. Approval of the project proposed in the Water Right application should be
obtained from local governmental entities as necessary to implement a project.

REFERENCES
Techn ical Publication No. 2, The Ogden Valley Artesian Reservoir, Weber County, Utah; Utah
State Engineer; 1945.
Technical Publication No. 27, Water Resources of the Heber-Kamas-Park City Area, North-Central
Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1970.
Technical Publication No. 35, Ground-water Conditions in the East Shore Area, Box Elder, Davis,
and Weber Counties, Utah, 1960-69; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1972.
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Technical Publication No. 76, Reconnaissance of the Quality of Surface Water in the Weber River
Basin, Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1983.
Technical Publication No. 77 , Ground-water Reconnaissance of the Central Weber River Area,
Morgan and Summit Counties, Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1984.
Technical Publication No. 85, Water Resources of the Park City Area, Utah, with Emphasis on
Ground Water; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1986.
Technical Publication No. 90, Seepage Studies of the Weber River and the Davis-Weber and
Ogden Valley Canals, Davis and Weber Counties, Utah, 1985; Utah Department of Natural
Resources; 1987.
Technical Publication No. 93, Ground-Water Resources of the East Shore Area of the Great Salt
Lake, Utah , and Simulated Effects of Ground-Water Withdrawals; Utah Department of Natural
Resources; 1990.
Technical Publication No. 99, Hydrology of Ogden Valley and the Surrounding Area, Eastern
Weber County, Utah, and Computer Simulation of the Valley-Fill Aquifer System; Utah Department
of Natural Resources; 1990.
Technical Publication No. 115, Hydrology and snowmelt simUlation of Snyderville Basin, Park City,
and adjacent areas, Summit County, Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1998.
Basic Data Report No . 1, Records and Water-Level Measurements of Selected Wells and
Chemical Analyses of Ground Water, East Shores Areas, Weber and Box Elder Counties, Utah;
Utah State Engineer; 1961.
Basic Data Report No . 45, Selected Hydrologic Data from Wells in the East Shore Area of the
Great Salt Lake, Utah, 1985; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1986.
Information Bulletin No. 9, Projected 1975 Municipal Water Use Requirements, Weber County,
Utah; Utah State Engineer; 1962.
Water Resource Bulletin No. 29, The Geology of the Kamas-Coalville Region, Summit County,
Utah , and its Relation to Ground-Water Conditions; Utah Geological Survey; 2002. Note: Very
large download!
UGS Special Study, Hydrogeology of Morgan Valley, Morgan County, Utah; Utah Geological
Survey; 2011 .

MODELING
Regional Ground-Water Flow, Carbonate-Rock Province, Nevada, Utah, and Adjacent States;
USGS Open-File Reports 93-170 and 93-420; 1993.
Morgan Valley Ground-water Flow Model; 1984.
Ogden Valley Ground-water Flow Model; 1991 .
Weber Delta Ground-water Flow Model, 1990.

PREVIOUS PAGE UPDATES
December 24, 2002, June 14, 2004, September 24, 2004, October 26, 2004 , April 10, 2011 ,
October 28, 2011
Utah Division of Water Rights I 1594 West North Temple Suite 220, P.O. Box 146300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6300 I 801-538-7240
Utah.gov I Natural Resources I Contact I Tenns of Use I Privacy Policy I Accessibility Policy I Translate Utah.goY
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Utah Code Ann . .§ 73-3-17
Statutes current through the 2018 Second Special Session

Utah Code Annotated> Title 73 Water and Irrigation (Chs. 1 - 30) > Chapter 3 Appropriation (§§ 73-3-173-3-31)

73-3-17. Certificate of appropriation - Evidence.
(l)Upon the satisfaction ofthe state engineer that an appropriation, a permanent change of point of diversion, place or
purpose of use, or a fixed time change authorized by Section 73-3-30 has been perfected in accordance with the
application, and that the water appropriated or affected by the change has been put to a beneficial use, as required by
Section 73-3-16 or 73-3-30, the state engineer shall issue a certificate, in duplicate, setting forth:
(a)the name and post-office address ofthe person by whom the water is used;
(b)the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in second-feet appropriated;
(c)the purpose for which the water is used;
(d)the time during which the water is to be used each year;
(e)the name of the stream or water source:
(i)from which the water is diverted; or
(ii)within which an instream flow is maintained;
(f)the date ofthe appropriation or change; and
(g)other information that defines the extent and conditions of actual application of the water to a beneficial use.
(2)A certificate issued on an application for one ofthe following types ofprojects need show no more than the facts shown
in the proof submitted under Section 73-3-16:
(a)a project constructed according to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources Resources;

Division of Water

(b)a federal project constructed by the United States Bureau ofReciamation, referred to in Section 73-3-16; and
(c)a surface water storage facility in excess of 1,000 acre-feet constructed by a public water supplier.
(3)A certificate under this section does not extend the rights described in the application.
(4)Failure to file proof of appropriation or proof of change of the water on or before the date set therefor causes the
application to lapse.
(S)One copy of a certificate issued under this section shall be filed in the office of the state engineer and the other shall be
delivered to the appropriator or to the person making the change who may record the certificate in the office of the county
recorder of the county in which the water is diverted from the natural stream or source.
(6)The celtificate issued under this section is prima facie evidence of the owner's right to use the water in the quantity, for
the purpose, at the place, and during the time specified therein, subject to prior rights.
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Paul B. Anderson
Consulting Geologist

US Geological Survey Map GQ-1S03.
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1000 ' 2000

~

Inferred ground water flow line
(longer line implies longer travel distances)

